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Education and Conflict Recovery: The Case of Timor Leste 
 
 
Patricia Justino, Marinella Leone and Paola Salardi 
 
 
 
Summary  
 
The Timor Leste secession conflict lasted for 25 years. Its last wave of violence in 1999, 
following the withdrawal of Indonesian troops, generated massive displacement and 
destruction with widespread consequences for the economic and social development of the 
country. This paper analyses the impact of the conflict on the level and access to education 
of boys and girls in Timor Leste. We examine the short-term impact of the 1999 violence on 
school attendance and grade deficit rates in 2001, and the longer-term impact of the conflict 
on primary school completion of cohorts of children observed in 2007. We compare also the 
educational impact of the 1999 wave of violence with the impact of other periods of high-
intensity violence during the 25 years of Indonesian occupation. The short-term effects of the 
conflict are mixed. In the longer term, we find a strong negative impact of the conflict on 
primary school completion among boys of school age exposed to peaks of violence during 
the 25-year long conflict. The effect is stronger for boys attending the last three grades of 
primary school. This result shows a substantial loss of human capital among young males in 
Timor Leste since the early 1970s, resulting from household investment trade-offs between 
education and economic survival.  
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Introduction 
 
Violent conflict is one of the most important development challenges facing the world today. 
The incidence of wars has decreased in recent years (Harbom and Wallensteen 2009). 
However, the legacy of violence persists in many regions, affecting millions of men, women 
and children (Geneva Declaration Secretariat 2008; UNHCR 2008). The economic, political 
and social consequences of violence are far-reaching. Violent forms of conflict kill, injure and 
displace people, destroy physical capital and infrastructure and change the ways in which 
societies are organized. These effects will have considerable consequences for the long-
term human capital accumulation of populations exposed to violence. This is well visible in 
the fact that no conflict-affected country will reach the Millennium Development Goals by 
2015 (DFID 2009): conflict-affected countries contain one-third of those living in extreme 
poverty, and are responsible for almost one-half of child mortality in the world (Collier 2007; 
DFID 2009). They also account for 42 per cent of all out-of-school children (28 million 
children), even though only 18 per cent of all children in the world of primary school age live 
in conflict-affected countries (UNESCO 2011). 
 
The objective of this paper is to examine one important channel linking violent conflict and 
development outcomes: the level and access to education of children living in contexts of 
conflict and violence. The paper focuses on the impact of the conflict in Timor Leste on 
primary school attendance, grade deficits and primary school attainments of boys and girls. 
We look in particular at the impact of the last wave of violence in 1999 that followed the 
withdrawal of Indonesian troops from the territory. We analyse the short-term impact of the 
1999 wave of violence on primary school attendance and primary school grade deficits in 
2001, and the medium-term impact on primary school completion in 2007. In addition, we are 
also able to examine separately the impact of early periods of high-intensity violence of the 
25 years of Indonesian occupation. This rich amount of information allows us to compare and 
contrast the impact of different processes of violence that take place in long-lasting conflicts. 
Finally, we assess also the effects of the entire conflict on primary school completion in 2007 
in order to check whether the average impact is different or in line with analyzing singularly 
peaks of violence. To the best of our knowledge this is the first time that researchers are able 
to compare the impact of violence on educational outcomes in the short, medium and long 
terms. The paper represents also one of the very first attempts to quantify empirically the 
impact of the violence in Timor Leste on individuals exposed to the 25 years of violent 
conflict. To this purpose, we make use of three unique datasets that allow us to understand 
in detail the mechanisms linking violence and educational achievement. 
 
From a theoretical point of view, the long-term developmental effects of violent conflict are 
ambiguous. Standard neoclassical growth models predict high rates of growth in the post-
conflict period as the economy converges to its steady state growth rate. In particular, the 
temporary destruction of capital can be overcome in the long-run by higher investments in 
affected areas.1 Violent conflict may also be associated with long term positive 
developmental outcomes via greater popular participation in civic and political institutions 
(Bellows and Miguel 2006; Blattman 2009), and increases in trust and cooperation (Voors et 
al. 2010). 
 
But the long-term destructive effects of violent conflict may remain entrenched in certain 
regions and among some population groups even if economic growth converges at the 
aggregate level. Recent research on the micro-level effects of violent conflict has shown that 
the negative impact of conflict on educational outcomes, labor market participation and 
                                                 
1  See discussion in Blattman and Miguel (2010), and evidence in Bellows and Miguel (2006), Davis and Weinstein (2002), 
Brakman, Garrtesen and Shramm (2004), Miguel and Roland (2006), Justino and Verwimp (2006) and Chen, Loayza 
and Reynal-Querol (2007). 
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health status of individuals and households may be observed decades after the conflict 
(Akbulut-Yuksel 2009; Akresh and de Walque 2008; Alderman, Hoddinott and Kinsey 2006; 
Bundervoet, Verwimp and Akresh 2009; Ibáñez and Moya 2009; Shemyakina 2010). 
Although these effects may average out at the aggregate level, they may contribute to the 
emergence of poverty traps among specific groups affected by violence (Justino 2009, 
2010a).  
 
Children may be particularly affected by conflict given that many key human capital 
investments are age-specific. Violent conflict can interrupt the education of children through 
the destruction of schools, the targeting of teachers, the increase in fear and insecurity, 
changes in family structures and changes in household asset holdings and income (Justino 
2010b; UNESCO 2011). Conflict may also impact negatively on children through health and 
nutritional channels, due to the association of violent conflict with famines, malnutrition, the 
outbreak of infectious diseases, post-war trauma, and the destruction of health facilities. In 
addition, household coping strategies during conflict often lead to rises in child labor and the 
removal of children from school (Rodriguez and Sanchez 2009). The destruction of human 
capital during childhood in turn is a well-documented mechanism underlying the emergence 
of poverty traps, given the severe long-run intergenerational effects it can have on individual 
and household welfare (Becker 1962; Case and Paxson 2008; Maccini and Young 2009; 
Mincer 1974; Shultz 1961).  
 
These micro-level effects of violent conflict remain largely under-researched. In this paper, 
we focus on the analysis of the impact of 25 years of violent conflict in Timor Leste on 
several educational outcomes among cohorts of boys and girls of primary school age 
affected by the violence. We measure the short-term effects of conflict at the household level 
using information on household displacement and the destruction of household dwellings 
during the violent events. We are also able to measure conflict intensity across time – 
including peaks of violence at various stages of the conflict – at the district level from event 
data on violence intensity during the conflict in Timor Leste. We focus on primary school 
effects because only a small percentage of the Timorese population attended secondary 
school.  
 
Our results show mixed evidence for the impact of violent conflict on educational outcomes. 
Mirroring some of the findings of Bellows and Miguel (2006) and others, we find evidence for 
a rapid recovery of the education sector in Timor Leste, and of educational outcomes, 
particularly for girls. However, in line with emerging results in the micro-level literature, we 
find that the 1999 wave of violence in Timor Leste – as well as peaks of violence in the 
1970s and 1980s – resulted in negative effects on primary school attendance and 
attainment. This effect is particularly strong for boys. We attribute the first result to a process 
of educational catch-up among girls in Timor Leste that started before the conflict and 
continued despite the conflict. The second result is likely to be due to large rates of grade 
repetition and of delay entry that were exacerbated by the need to remove boys from school 
due to the negative economic effects of the conflict on households more exposed to the 
violence.  
 
The paper is structured as follows. In Section 1, we present a literature review on the impact 
of violent conflict on development outcomes in general and education in particular. Section 2 
provides a descriptive background of the conflict in Timor Leste and the country’s education 
sector. In Section 3, we describe the datasets, discuss our identification strategy and present 
some descriptive results. Section 4 discusses our empirical results, as well as a range of 
robustness checks. Section 5 concludes the paper.  
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1  Literature review 
 
An emerging body of literature has provided valuable empirical evidence on the effects of 
violent conflict on income and consumption levels, and more generally on the welfare of 
populations living in areas of violence (Ibáñez and Moya 2009; Justino and Verwimp 2006; 
Verwimp and Bundervoet 2008). A significant number of studies have also examined the 
health impact of violent conflict, finding that violence results in negative health effects in 
terms of lower height-for-age and lower nutritional outcomes among children that will 
generate long-term consequences on future outcomes.2  
 
There is also some research on the effect of violent conflict on education. Despite the 
emerging nature of this empirical literature, a few common themes have started to surface 
(Justino 2010b). The first is that violent conflict almost always results in reductions in 
education access and attainment. Alderman, Hoddinott and Kinsey (2006) find that 
Zimbabwean children affected by the civil war in the 1970s and ensuing droughts completed 
fewer grades of schooling and/or started school later than those not affected by the shocks. 
Akresh and de Walque (2008) find a negative impact of the Rwanda genocide on the 
educational outcomes of children (boys in particular) that were of schooling age in 1994. 
Shemyakina (2010) finds that the 1992–98 civil war in Tajikistan had a negative effect on 
school enrolment of girls (but not of boys). Girls that lived in conflict-affected regions were  
12 per cent less likely to complete mandatory schooling in comparison with girls who 
completed their schooling before the conflict started. They are also seven per cent less likely 
to complete school than girls of the same age who lived in regions relatively unaffected by 
the civil war. Similar negative impacts are reported in Angrist and Kugler (2008) and 
Rodriguez and Sanchez (2009) for Colombia, Chamarbagwala and Morán (2009) for 
Guatemala and de Walque (2004) and Merrouche (2006) for Cambodia.  
 
The second major finding is that relatively minor shocks to educational access during 
childhood can lead to significant and long-lasting detrimental effects on individual human 
capital formation in terms of educational attainment, health outcomes and labor market 
opportunities. Akbulut-Yuksel (2009) finds strong evidence for long-lasting detrimental effects 
of Allied bombing in Germany during WWII on education, health and labor market outcomes 
of individuals who were at school-age during WWII. Sixty years after the end of the war, 
these individuals were observed to have fewer years of schooling on average in adulthood, 
were about one centimeter shorter and had lower self-reported health satisfaction in 
adulthood. At first glance these appear to be very small effects (between 0.4 and 1.2 years of 
schooling on average). However, they translated into a very significant reduction of six per 
cent in labor market earnings, in relation to those not affected by the bombings. Ichino and 
Winter-Ebner (2004) show that Austrian and German children who were ten years old during 
WWII lost around 20 per cent of a year of schooling on average. These negative educational 
effects of the war, and consequent reduction in earnings, are reflected in significant 
reductions in overall GDP in Germany and Austrian almost forty years after the war. 
Merrouche (2006) analyses the long-run effects of land mine contamination on human capital 
in Cambodia 30 years after the end of the Khmer Rouge regime. She finds that landmine 
exposure resulted in a loss of about 0.4 years of education, a significant estimate given that 
the average number of years of education of the sample was around 4.5 years.  
 
Thirdly, the exposure of households to violence results in significant gender differentials in 
individual educational outcomes. Shemyakina (2010) finds that exposure to the Tajik conflict, 
as measured by physical damage to households’ dwellings, had a significant and negative 
effect on the enrolment of girls. She observes little or no effect on the enrolment of boys, and 
                                                 
2  See Alderman et al. (2006) for Zimbabwe, Bundervoet et al. (2009) for Burundi, Akresh and Verwimp (2006), Akresh, 
Verwimp and Bundervoet (2007) and Akresh and de Walque (2008) for Rwanda and Guerrero-Serdán (2009) for Iraq. 
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postulates that households affected by conflict invested more in the schooling of boys 
because it may make more economic sense to educate boys. In a similar vein, 
Chamarbagwala and Móran (2010) find a strong negative impact of the 1979–1984 civil war 
in Guatemala on female education, also attributable to the higher returns to education among 
boys. In contrast, Akresh and de Walque (2008) find that, in Rwanda, male children in non-
poor households experienced the most severe reductions in educational achievements 
following the 1994 genocide. This paper builds on and contributes to this emerging literature 
and findings. 
 
2  Violent conflict and the education sector in 
Timor Leste 
 
2.1 A brief history of Timor Leste 
Timor Leste occupies the Eastern part of the island of Timor in the Indonesian archipelago, 
and includes also the island of Atauro, the island of Jaco and the enclave of Oè-Cussè. The 
sea surrounding Timor is rich of oil and natural gas, which largely explains the strategic 
interest that this small territory of just over one million people has generated in recent 
decades. 
 
Map 2.1 Timor Leste 
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Timor Leste was under Portuguese colonial rule from 1500 until 1974. After the Portuguese 
left, Indonesia perceived Timor Leste as a communist threat to their national security and 
forcefully annexed the territory in July 1976. At that point, a guerrilla war started, spurred by 
the Revolutionary Front for independence (FRETILIN) and its armed wing (FALINTIL), which 
tried to resist the repression imposed by the Indonesian forces. In the early occupation years, 
a large number of civilians abandoned the towns and moved to the interior of the country, 
mainly to mountainous areas, to be safe from Indonesia’s military control. Several thousands 
of individuals were forcibly displaced during the Indonesian occupation, and were made to 
live in extreme conditions without adequate food, shelter and health facilities. Around 60,000 
people lost their lives in the early years of the occupation. The number of deaths reached 
200,000 by the end of the occupation (UNDP 2002). At the same time, the Indonesian 
government forced many people to resettle and imposed the Indonesian language, its culture 
and education system. The people of Timor Leste never accepted this imposition and tried to 
preserve their own culture and identity. The Santa Cruz massacre in November 1991, in 
which 200 protesters were killed by Indonesian forces, was broadcasted by international 
media. This raised considerable international attention to the brutalities and human rights 
violations during the Indonesian occupation. Timor Leste’s independence movements started 
then to receive support from the Portuguese government and international organizations, 
including the UN. These events, together with the 1997 financial crisis which badly affected 
the Indonesian economy and its political situation, resulted in the decision by the Indonesian 
government, in agreement with the Portuguese government, to hold a referendum on the 
independence of Timor Leste. 
 
On 30 August 1999, 79 per cent of the Timor Leste population voted in favour of 
independence. The output of the referendum generated a wave of destruction, violence and 
human rights violations by Indonesian forces and pro-autonomy militia (Alonso and Brugha 
2006). Large displacement movements (both forced and spontaneous) took place before and 
after the popular consultation in 1999. More than half of the population was displaced. 
Around 40 per cent of these were forcibly displaced to refugee camps in West Timor, and 
about 60 per cent escaped towards the mountains or somewhere else within Timor Leste 
(UNDP 2002). The majority of displaced and refugee populations returned back to Timor 
Leste shortly after the violence ended. The number of killings during this wave of violence 
has been estimated to be around 1,000 to 2,000 people (UNDP 2002). In addition to these 
deaths, the wave of violence in 1999 resulted also in the massive destruction of 
infrastructure, health facilities, schools and public and private buildings that the Indonesian 
forces found on their way towards West Timor. In October 1999, a United Nations 
Transitional Administration was settled in Timor Leste (UNTAET). 
 
2.2 Conflict variation across time and space 
The secession conflict in Timor Leste has evolved over time and across space in different 
ways. The Timor Leste Commission for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation (CAVR), 
established in 2001 and mandated by the UNTAET to ‘undertake truth seeking’ for the 1975–
1999 conflict, has identified three distinct phases of the conflict during the entire period 
between December 1975 and September 1999. The first phase, from 1975 to 1984, is 
related to the initial Indonesian invasion and occupation of Timor-Leste. The first few years, 
from 1975 to 1979, were the most intense in terms of killings and destruction. The second 
phase, from 1985 to 1998, was characterized by the consolidation and normalization of the 
occupation. Although people were killed in this phase (for instance, during the Santa Cruz 
massacre), violence during this period was of relatively low intensity. The third phase of the 
conflict is identified with the 1999 withdrawal of Indonesian troops and the ensuing wave of 
violence. Figure 2.1 illustrates this variation in violence over time.  
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Figure 2.1 Number of violations over time 
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Source: Authors’ own computations using CAVR (2006) 
 
The conflict was also characterized by significant variation at the geographical level as 
shown in Figures 2.2a and 2.2b. Violence was mostly concentrated in specific areas and its 
variation at the geographical level mostly followed the movement of the Indonesian military 
forces. The occupation was more intense initially in the Western region of Timor Leste and it 
then spread to the Central and Eastern regions, with some districts in the Central region 
having been particularly affected. The last wave of violence in 1999 was particularly intense 
in the Western region and in the urban areas of the Central regions. 
 
Figure 2.2a Number of killings over time and across districts 
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Source: Authors’ own computations using CAVR (2006) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 12 
 
Figure 2.2b Number of deaths due to deprivation over time and across districts 
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Source: Authors’ own computations using CAVR (2006)  
 
The violent attacks in 1999 were mainly conducted by militia groups with strong linkages to 
the Indonesian forces. These groups were first established in the Western and Central 
districts and then expanded to the East. The reason why the militias first emerged in the 
western districts and were stronger and more active in this region was mainly due to the 
geographical proximity to the West Timor border, which offered logistical advantages to the 
development of militias. The proximity to the border was also an essential condition for the 
massive displacement of people to West Timor. The majority of the displaced people to West 
Timor originated from the western districts and lived along the main roads to the border. 
They were attacked by the Indonesian forces and the militia while they withdrew towards 
West Timor after the referendum vote. The concentration of the violence in 1999 in the 
western districts was also due to the fact that there was a long-established network of pro-
Indonesians that existed already before 1999. The Eastern and Central regions were, in 
contrast, important areas for the resistance forces (Robinson 2003). We will explore this 
variation of violence across time and space in more detail in the empirical sections. 
 
2.3 The education sector in Timor Leste 
Large amounts of funds from bilateral and multilateral donors flew into Timor Leste from 
1999 onwards to support the reconstruction and rehabilitation of the country (e.g. Trust Fund 
for East Timor, TFET, managed by the World Bank, and other funds from bilateral donors 
including Portugal, Japan and the European Union). Although Timor Leste was severely 
devastated during the wave of violence in 1999, the rebuilt of state institutions, schools, 
infrastructure and markets was relatively successful and fast. The main development 
indicators for Timor Leste in 2001 were close to those in the pre-1999 period. But Timor 
Leste was (and is) still one of the world’s least developed countries (UNDP 2002; WDI 2010).  
The evolution of education in Timor Leste has been characterized by three distinct periods, 
coinciding with (i) the Portuguese colonial rule (from early 1500s to 1975), (ii) the Indonesian 
occupation (from 1975 to 1999) and (iii) the UNTAET administration (from October 1999 until 
independence in May 2002). Under Portuguese colonial rule, education was administered via 
the Catholic Church. Churches were the major providers of education and schooling was 
mostly available to the elite in urban areas. When, in 1975, Indonesia invaded the country, 
literacy rates were extremely low, at around five per cent (UNDP 2002). Gender disparities 
were also very large.  
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The Indonesian government planned to expand education access to the whole population of 
Timor Leste. Education was used as a means to control the population, and the Portuguese 
and Tetum languages were abolished. Under the Indonesian education system, children had 
to enroll in primary school by the age of 7, and were supposed to finish primary school at  
12 years old (grade 6). In 1994, basic education was made compulsory up to low secondary 
school (nine grades of education up to age 15). But, as there was no enforcement 
mechanism to complete all nine grades, the average schooling level across the population of 
Timor Leste was still primary school.  
 
Enrolment rates increased dramatically over those years, with gross enrolment ratios around 
90 per cent. The gender gap also started to close down. In 1995, every village in Timor Leste 
had a primary school (UNDP 2002). Despite these encouraging figures, education 
performance under the Indonesian occupation was still characterized by delayed entry to 
school, high repetition rates and high drop-out rates. The net enrolment ratio in 1995 was  
70 per cent. In that year, less than half of individuals aged between 15 and 19 had completed 
primary school education (UNDP 2002).  
 
The main reasons explaining this poor performance were the low quality of school standards, 
the low quality of teachers, shortages of textbooks and classrooms, and the inability of 
households to pay for school fees and other additional costs, such as books or uniforms. 
Another reason was the unwillingness of some Timorese people to send their children to 
school, as this was seen as a sign of being part of the Indonesian repressive system (UNPD 
2002). 
 
After the referendum in 1999, almost all schools were destroyed and most teachers fled to 
Indonesia. The school system was almost totally destroyed in the ensuing wave of violence, 
and schools did not reopen until October 2000.3 The reconstruction process in the aftermath 
of 1999 was very rapid as significant flows of international aid reached the country.  
 
Immediately after 1999, primary school enrolment rates increased significantly with a large 
number of over-age students enrolling in primary school for the first time. This created an 
enrolment ‘bulge’ in primary school levels (Nicolai 2004). The net primary school enrolment 
rose by 10 percentage points (from 65 to 74 per cent) between 1999 and 2001 (World Bank 
2003a). Literacy rates increased from 40 to 43 per cent between 1999 and 2001. Gender 
differentials shrunk significantly, mainly due to the large rise in female literacy rates from  
34 to 43 per cent in the same period (World Bank 2003a). 
 
Despite the significant increase in enrolment rates, the reconstruction of the school system in 
Timor Leste faced many challenges. First, there was a shortage of teachers given that the 
majority, being Indonesian, had left the country by the end of 1999 (UNDP 2006). There was 
also a shortage of teachers that could teach in Portuguese. Second, not all schools were 
reconstructed and, as a result, school distances were much higher for some children than 
before the destruction. While enrolments were high, school attendance was low. Third, 
emergency funds were only available for a limited period of time. In 2001, 57 per cent of the 
Timorese population still had no or little education. 
 
Figure 2.3 reports the average educational grade attainment by year of birth and by gender 
in 2007. We include individuals born between 1950 and 1992. The data shows that cohorts 
that were of school age during the Indonesian occupation achieved higher level of education 
than older cohorts (i.e. those born in the 1970s compared to those born in the 1960s or 
before) testifying for an increasing trend as expected. The figure shows that despite the 
increasing trend a large fraction of individuals have low education levels. Interestingly, all 
                                                 
3  However, anecdotal evidence shows that some children were still able to attend school in the 1999/00 academic year 
either in refugee camps or in local schools were people were displaced (Nicolai 2004). 
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curves start to drop after the 1987 cohort. This decreasing trend is observed among 
individuals aged 20 or younger in 2007 and provides evidence of a mismatch between the 
grade attended and the grade that they should have achieved at their age.4 This is caused by 
a persistent sluggishness in grade achievement due to the high level of delayed entry to 
school and high rates of repetition.5  
 
Figure 2.3 Average educational grade achieved by gender 
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Source: Authors’ own computations using TLSS (2007).  
 
The impact of the conflict in its different phases and the subsequent reconstruction efforts on 
schooling levels of children in Timor Leste is therefore unclear. The early years of violence 
coincided with an education for all policy in which quantity was preferred to quality. In 
addition, the 1999 violence that followed the withdrawal of Indonesian troops led to the 
destruction of schools and the removal of children from school. The reconstruction program 
implemented after 1999 tried to counteract this destruction, and achieved fast progress. 
However, the education sector was still in very poor shape. In the next section, we 
investigate in more detail the effects of the conflict on educational outcomes of boys and girls 
in Timor Leste. 
 
3  Identification strategy and data description  
 
The main objective of this paper is to assess the educational effects of the conflict in Timor 
Leste. First, we analyse the short-term consequences of the last wave of violence in 1999 on 
school attendance and on grade deficit rates observed in 2001 among children who were of 
primary school age in 1999. Second, we examine the medium term consequences of the 
conflict on school attainment of the same cohort observed again in 2007. Third, we 
investigate the long term consequences of the most intense early years of the conflict 
between Timor Leste and Indonesia on school attainment outcomes of exposed individuals 
observed in 2007. Finally, we assess the average effect of the conflict on primary education 
outcomes in the longer term by looking at the average effect of exposure to the conflict as a 
                                                 
4  Those born in 1992 are 15 in 2007. So they might have at most completed grade 9 and this justifies part of the drop in 
the curves as the grade completed is right censored. 
5  The high levels of school delay are also confirmed by the figures on gross and net enrolment ratios calculated using the 
TLSS 2001 and 2007: primary gross enrolment ratio was 105 per cent in 2001 and 128 per cent in 2007, while net 
enrolment ratios were 74 and 94 per cent, respectively, in 2001 and 2007. 
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whole. We focus on primary schooling because most individuals in Timor Leste (65 per cent) 
have at most only primary school education (TLSS 2007b). The empirical study is based on 
two cross-sectional household surveys: the Timor Leste Living Standard Measurement 
Surveys (TLSS), conducted in 2001 and 2007, jointly by the National Statistics Directorate in 
Timor Leste and the World Bank. They are both nationally representative household surveys, 
and include a broad range of individual and household level indicators.  
 
The TLSS 2001 surveyed 1800 households from 100 Sucos (villages) (covering nearly one 
per cent of the population). The survey was conducted between August and November 2001. 
Interestingly, this survey includes very detailed information on the exposure of individuals 
and households to the wave of violence in 1999. Respondents were asked whether they 
were displaced and whether their house was destroyed due to the violent events that 
followed the withdrawal of Indonesian forces in 1999. We make use of this valuable 
information to get insights on the characteristics of individuals and households affected by 
the violent events in 1999.  
 
The TLSS 2007 covered a sample of 4,477 households from all the 498 Sucos that form 
Timor Leste. The TLSS 2007 was undertaken over a period of 12 months between 
December 2007 and January 2008. The survey was in fact launched in March 2006 but had 
to be suspended due to the outbreak of internal violence in the country (mostly in Dili). The 
survey was resumed in January 2007 and conducted over one year.6 The TLSS 2007 
contains the usual information included in a comprehensive household survey. But contrary 
to the TLSS 2001, the 2007 household survey does not contain direct information on 
violence exposure. In order to identify individuals and households affected by the conflict, we 
make use of data on events and violations contained in the Human Rights Violations 
Database (HRVD). This dataset is part of the CAVR Timor-Leste Data Publication, 
developed jointly by the Human Rights Data Analysis Group (HRDAG) and the Commission 
for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation (CAVR).7 This information has been collected from 
deponents to the Commission’s statement-taking process.8 We make use of data on the 
number of killings that occurred during the war in order to derive patterns and variation of 
violence in Timor Leste over time and across space. We use this data to identify districts and 
years that experienced high and low violence-intensity, both at the start of the occupation 
and following the withdrawal of Indonesian troops in 1999. This allows us to estimate both 
the impact of the first years of the conflict and the impact of the last wave of violence in 1999. 
 
3.1 Identification strategy: the impact of violence on school attendance in 2001 
We first investigate the short-term impact of the 1999 violence. The empirical questions 
being addressed are: (i) whether the violence in 1999 imperiled school attendance9 and 
school grade deficit, and (ii) whether different channels of exposure to conflict – 
displacement and house destruction – affected boys and girls and different age groups 
differently. 
 
                                                 
6  All households interviewed in 2006 (351 households) were revisited and re-interviewed in 2007. Those not found at the 
time of the new interview (34 households) were replaced with new households. For more information see 
http://dne.mof.gov.tl/TLSLS/AboutTLSLS/index.htm. 
7  Commission for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation & Benetech Human Rights Data Analysis Group, ‘Human Rights 
Violations Database’, 9 February 2006, www.hrdag.org/resources/timor-leste_data.shtml 
8  There may be potential sample biases in the statement taking procedure given the voluntary nature of the process. It is 
possible that those living in more remote or mountainous areas, those living far away from the areas where the 
statements were taken, the sick, old and disabled and those with no access to the media or means of mass 
communication have a lower probability of being part of the sample. By contrast, those more active in local communities 
are more likely to have provided a testimony. In order to address these potential sample biases, the CAVR 
supplemented its documentation with reports produced by Amnesty International and Fokupers (a local NGO). The 
information contained in these reports was then included into the HRVD database. 
9  Note that we do not analyse school completion in 2001 because most children that were of school age in 1999 were still 
in school in 2001. 
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3.1.1 Primary school attendance and grade deficit rates in 2001 
We make use of information in TLSS 2001 collected at the individual and household levels 
on displacement and house destruction to identify conflict-affected individuals. We have 
constructed two different variables that try to account for the degree of severity of the 
conflict.10 The first variable identifies individuals belonging to households that were displaced 
due to the 1999 wave of violence (all members displaced). The second variable identifies 
individuals in households that report having their house completely destroyed by the violent 
attacks in 1999. 
 
The TLSS 2001 contains also useful retrospective information on school attendance and 
grade attained across three different academic years: 1998/99, 1999/00 and 2000/01. We 
are interested in the year of recovery, the academic year 2000/01. Since the 1999 violence 
occurred mainly in the summer and fall of 1999, we can assume with a certain degree of 
confidence that the academic year of 1998/99 was not affected by conflict, while the 
academic year of 1999/00 started under the wave of violence. Almost all schools were 
destroyed during the violence in 1999 and most teachers escaped to West Timor during the 
1999/00 academic year. Therefore, very few children were able to attend school that year. 
The very few that attended school were in makeshift schools in IDP camps or in the open air. 
We report in Table 3.1 (see over) average school attendance rates, disaggregated by gender 
and age groups, across these three academic years. The sample includes children aged 
between 7 and 12 years old over the three years considered: the sample is aged 7–10 in 
1998, 8–11 in 1999 (during the violence) and 9–12 in 2000. 
 
In general, we notice that attendance rates have increased over time and are generally 
higher for girls. The difference in outcomes between boys and girls is not statistically 
significant, but is nonetheless an interesting result. The higher attendance rates observed 
among girls in 1998/99 show evidence for a gender catching up phenomenon, which started 
before 1999. In the post-violence year, the difference in attendance rates between girls and 
boys becomes statistically significant, particularly for the younger cohort. This seems to 
suggest that educational outcomes among girls recovered faster in the post-conflict period. 
 
In addition to the analysis of school attendance, we explore also the impact of the 1999 
violence on school grade deficit. The grade deficit is computed as follows: 
 
 
 
The TLSS 2001 does not allow us to distinguish whether the grade deficit is due to drop outs, 
delayed entry or grade repetition. We restrict our sample to only those children that attend all 
three years consecutively in order to isolate the consequences of the violence on the sample 
of individuals that do not drop out.  
 
The attendance rate over the three years for all children aged 8–11 in 1999 is on average 
around 72 per cent (Table 3.1). The attendance rate for those that attended all three years is 
lower. Table 3.2 (see over) shows the average grade deficit over the three years. Two main 
patterns are visible. First, the average grade deficit – which was already significant in 
1998/1999 – increased during the conflict. Second, young girls tend to have a higher grade 
deficit than young boys while old girls show a lower grade deficit than older boys. The 
differences are however not statistically significant.  
 
                                                 
10  The questions we used are ‘Was [NAME] displaced outside E. Timor in 1999?’, and ‘Was the [BUILDING] damaged in 
the violence of 1999?’ 14 per cent of the whole sample surveyed in 2001 report having been displaced, while 26 per 
cent report that their house was destroyed. Within our sample of school age children, these figures are 16 per cent and 
25 per cent, respectively. We have made sure that buildings that are reported to having been destroyed were used for 
living purposes only. 
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Table 3.1 Attendance rates of children aged between 7–12 years, 2001 
 
 All: 8–11 years old Younger cohort: 8–9 years old Older cohort: 10–11 years old 
 all Boys girls t-test all boys girls t-test all boys girls t-test 
1998/99 0.634 0.611 0.659  0.509 0.498 0.521  0.750 0.720 0.782  
 (0.012) (0.018) (0.017) n.s. (0.020) (0.027) (0.028) n.s. (0.018) (0.026) (0.025) n.s. 
1999/00 0.676 0.654 0.700  0.622 0.602 0.647  0.726 0.705 0.749  
 (0.012) (0.017) (0.017) n.s. (0.019) (0.027) (0.028) n.s. (0.018) (0.026) (0.026) n.s. 
2000/01 0.854 0.836 0.874  0.822 0.789 0.860  0.884 0.881 0.887  
 (0.014) (0.019) (0.019) * (0.022) (0.030) (0.031) ** (0.021) (0.029) (0.029) n.s. 
N 966 512 454  466 251 215  500 261 239  
Source: Authors’ computations using TLSS (2001). 
Note: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. n.s.= not statistically significant. We consider the same cohort over time (those aged 8–11 
in 1999). 
 
Table 3.2 Grade deficit of children aged between 7–12 years, 2001 
 
 All: 8–11 years old Younger cohort: 8–9 years old Older cohort: 10–11 years old 
 All Boys girls t-test all boys girls t-test all boys girls t-test 
1998/99 0.628 0.663 0.591  0.229 0.196 0.265  0.883 0.976 0.790  
 (0.089) (0.132) (0.119) n.s. (0.145) (0.212) (0.196) n.s. (0.114) (0.170) (0.151) * 
1999/00 0.832 0.864 0.799  0.444 0.420 0.471  1.081 1.162 1.000  
 (0.094) (0.140) (0.124) n.s. (0.154) (0.225) (0.207) n.s. (0.120) (0.180) (0.157) n.s. 
2000/01 1.007 1.025 0.989  0.659 0.598 0.725  1.231 1.311 1.150  
 (0.098) (0.146) (0.130) n.s. (0.162) (0.236) (0.218) n.s. (0.126) (0.188) (0.166) n.s. 
N 548 279 269  214 112 102  334 167 167  
Source: Authors’ computations using TLSS (2001). 
Note: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. n.s.= not statistically significant. We consider the same cohort over time (those aged 8–11 
in 1999). The sample in this table includes only those children who attended primary school consecutively in all three years. 
 
3.1.2 Empirical strategy 
In order to make use of the retrospective information on school attendance provided in the 
dataset, we have constructed what we have called an ‘ad hoc panel’, whereby we exploit the 
time-variation of the variables of interests (age, attendance status and grade attained by the 
respondents) by reshaping the cross-sectional structure of the TLSS 2001 dataset. In this 
way, we are able to obtain observations for each individual over three academic years. All 
key education variables are time-variant, while other individuals and households 
characteristics are time-invariant.  
 
Within these three years, we focus our analysis on individuals that were of primary school 
age (between 7 and 12 years old) in each year. In practice, we keep all children aged at 
minimum 7 years old in 1998 and at maximum 12 years old in 2000. As a consequence, our 
panel data contains children aged 8–11 years in 1999, the year of the violence.11 Since we 
are interested in looking at different effects across groups of individuals, we have split the 
sample between boys and girls and between younger children (aged 8–9 in 1999) and older 
children (aged 10–11 in 1999). We estimate the following equation: 
 
 
 
where  are our outcome variables, i.e. attendance rate (which is a binary variable)12 or 
grade deficit.  and  are year dummies respectively for year 2, the year of the 1999 
violence, and for year 3, the first year of the post-conflict period. The model includes 
                                                 
11  We have also tried to keep a larger sample that includes those children in primary school age in the year of the violence 
(i.e. between 7 and 12 in 1999). This means including individuals aged 6 in year 1 and aged 13 in year 3. The inclusion 
of these latter individuals may generate ‘spurious’ results as they are not of primary school age. We have estimated the 
model using both samples. We find that the estimates using the larger sample are similar to those obtained with the 
sample of children aged between 8 and 11 in 1999. The larger sample generates more statistically significant results but 
we have decided to opt for the most restrictive sample to avoid inclusion of ‘tails’ of the age distribution that are not of 
primary school age. 
12  We estimate our model with a linear probability model.  
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individual fixed effects, . The variable is the random error. All standard errors are 
clustered at the village level.  
 
As discussed above, we identify violence-affected individuals using two different measures, 
, with j=1,2 depending on which measure is included in the specification. The first one is 
whether the individual was displaced with the whole household. The second is whether the 
individual reports that her house was completely destroyed during the 1999 violence. We 
allow the violence measure to interact with both year dummies. The estimation of our 
specification above is therefore essentially a difference-in-difference methodology (DID, 
hereafter). Hence,  represents the DID term between the pre-war year and the year of 
conflict, while  represents the DID term between the pre-war year and the post-war 
year. Given our research questions, we are more interested in the latter so we focus our 
attention on the coefficient . 
 
Besides exploring the impact of each channel of violence exposure separately, we have also 
investigated the interaction of these two shocks by specifying a triple interaction in the 
equation as follows: 
 
 
 
 
This specification allows us to isolate the impact of only being displaced, only having the 
house destroyed and being affected by both shocks at the same time. The coefficients of 
interest are the interactions with T=3, namely the year of the post-violence. In the analysis of 
the empirical results in the next section, we focus on the magnitude and significance of  
and  that convey the impact of only being displaced and only being affected by the house 
destruction and  that convey the impact of being affected by both shocks simultaneously. 
We believe that this specification is more accurate and allows capturing effects otherwise 
ignored.13 
 
In order to provide some preliminary descriptive evidence of differences in attendance rates 
between affected and not affected individuals, we have plotted average school attendance 
rates and grade deficit rates between the two groups over the three years analysed. Figure 
3.1 (see over, source: authors’ own computations using TLSS 2001) shows attendance rates 
for each channel of violence exposure. Surprisingly, in the pre-conflict year, we note that 
attendance rates are higher for individuals in displaced households, particularly girls. This 
indicates that households affected by displacement are a particular type of family whose 
children are more likely to attend school. In the post-violence year, the attendance rates of 
girls that were affected by the conflict appear to have recovered faster than those of boys’. 
Girls affected by the conflict display also a statistically significant higher level of attendance 
with respect to girls not affected by the violence. But if we look at the difference between the 
displaced and not displaced group at T=3 (academic year 2000/01) relative to T=1 (academic 
year 1998/99), we notice that displacement has a more severe and negative impact on girls 
than boys (when comparing them with their respective not affected group). This larger effect 
on girls seems to be driven by the pre-conflict gap in school attendance levels between those 
affected by the violence and those not affected, which closes down considerably in the post 
violence year as a result of the conflict. 
                                                 
13   67.1 per cent of all children in our sample have not been affected by any shock. 7.5 per cent of all children have been 
displaced, and 17.4 per cent have had their house destroyed. 8 per cent of the sample was affected by both shocks 
during the 1999 violence. 
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Figure 3.1 School attendance rates by channel of violence exposure 
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In terms of house destruction, we notice that, in the year of the violence, children affected by 
this type of shock have on average much lower attendance rates than those not affected by 
the violence. The table shows no relevant differences in patterns between boys and girls. We 
observe only a small positive difference when comparing the two groups between T=3 and 
T=1.  
 
We notice in addition that those that were affected only by displacement (but not house 
destruction) exhibit higher attendance rates in all three periods (with the exception of girls for 
which the attendance rates is highest in the academic year 1998/99). If we take into account 
the differential effect relative to the unaffected group, we observe that the impact of 
displacement is negative for boys and slightly negative for girls. We find only a negligible 
effect of house destruction (when considered in isolation from displacement) on the 
education of boys. The impact of house destruction on girls’ education is positive despite the 
fact that they start with a lower attendance rate relative to the unaffected group. Finally, 
school education attendance rates of children exposed to both shocks seem to have been 
severely affected by the conflict, and do not recover in the post-war year.  
 
In Figure 3.2 (see over, source: authors’ own computations using TLSS 2001), we report the 
plots for grade deficit. Children affected by displacement show lower grade deficit than those 
not affected. However, there does not seem to be any effect of the conflict if we compare the 
two groups between 2000/01 and 1998/99. Children affected by house destruction have 
higher grade deficit than the group not affected by house destruction. The conflict seems to 
have only slightly increased the gap between the two groups in comparison to the pre-
violence year. This pattern is confirmed among children affected by both shocks 
simultaneously or by each of the shock separately. 
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Figure 3.2 Grade deficit by channel of conflict exposure  
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3.1.3 Potential biases and identification concerns  
The last wave of violence of 1999 was partially indiscriminate and partially targeted at 
specific individuals and localities (see Section 3). We have examined some relevant 
individual and household characteristics of children affected by the 1999 violence, and 
compared with the characteristics of households that do not report having been affected by 
the violence in 1999. These results are presented in Table 3.3 (see over). The table reports 
the means for the sample of children that we analyse disaggregated by gender (Panel A of 
Table 3.3). In panel B (page 24), we look at these characteristics by considering the 
interaction of the two channels of violence exposure.  
 
The table shows interesting results. Children of displaced households are better-off 
economically and more educated than households that were not displaced. They are also 
less likely to be farmers. On the other hand, households that report having their house 
destroyed by violent attacks are less educated and more likely to be farmers. These key 
features hold when we look at the relevant characteristics by gender. Significantly, we find 
also that children (aged 10–12)14 affected by displacement are more likely to work than 
children affected by house destruction. The difference is not however statistically significant. 
We find statistically significant differences in labor market outcomes by gender. Notably, we 
notice that displaced boys are more likely to work and for longer hours than boys that were 
not affected by displacement. The opposite is true for girls.  
 
The interaction between displacement and house destruction provides further insights into 
how the characteristics of children and their families differ relative to the type of violence they 
have been exposed to. Households affected by both shocks are more likely to be farmers, 
less educated and the poorest among the considered categories. This suggests that 
displaced households are likely to be urban households belonging or in some way related to 
the Timorese intelligentsia, who would have fled their areas of residence for fearing of being 
easily targeted by the Indonesian troops (see Section 2). Households that report house 
destruction only or both displacement and house destruction are likely to be indiscriminate 
victims of ‘scorch-earth’ tactics employed by the Indonesian troops while moving back to 
West Timor (Section 2).  
 
The discussion above leads us to conclude that the likelihood of an individual having been 
affected by the 1999 violence was not a totally random phenomenon, and there are 
observable characteristics of the households related to the likelihood of having been affected 
by the violence. There may also be unobserved household and individual characteristics 
which are correlated both with the conflict and the outcome variables.15 This may potentially 
lead to biases in the analysis, which are typically corrected through instrumental variable 
estimation techniques.  
                                                 
14  Employment characteristics are collected only on individuals of 10 years or older.  
15  One of the most common omitted variables in empirical research on the impact of violent conflict is the level of support 
of households for armed groups (see Wood 2003; Petersen 2001). Another common omitted variable is the level of 
control of different armed factions (Kalyvas 2006). In the case of Timor Leste, the level of control of FRETILIN and the 
Indonesian troops is likely to vary with the geographical characteristics of each area, as well as their proximity to West 
Timor.  
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Table 3.3 Individual and Household characteristics by channel of violence exposure 
 
Panel A – Considering channel of violence exposure singularly 
All children 7–12  Boys 7–12  Girls 7–12 
Displaced housedam displaced housedam displaced housedam 
0 1 t-test 0 1 t-test all 0 1 t-test 0 1 t-test all 0 1 t-test 0 1 t-test all 
Being female 0.472 0.500 0.484 0.454 n.s. 0.477
Speaking Indonesian 0.575 0.720 *** 0.584 0.632 n.s. 0.597 0.577 0.701 ** 0.580 0.634 n.s. 0.594 0.574 0.738 *** 0.589 0.631 0.599 
Speaking Portuguese 0.028 0.033 n.s. 0.030 0.027 n.s. 0.029 0.032 0.028 n.s. 0.031 0.035 n.s. 0.032 0.024 0.037 n.s. 0.029 0.018 0.026 
HH head is a farmer 0.646 0.556 ** 0.623 0.659 n.s. 0.632 0.649 0.570 n.s. 0.639 0.634 n.s. 0.638 0.642 0.542 * 0.606 0.690 ** 0.627 
Education grade of HH head 3.114 3.651 n.s. 3.332 2.783 ** 3.193 2.954 3.210 n.s. 3.099 2.685 n.s. 2.989 3.293 4.084 n.s. 3.581 2.899 * 3.415 
Education grade of the mother 1.870 2.785 *** 2.200 1.435 *** 2.005 1.827 2.252 n.s. 2.061 1.406 ** 1.887 1.918 3.318 *** 2.348 1.470 *** 2.135 
Education grade of the father 2.824 3.495 * 3.037 2.589 ** 2.923 2.802 2.869 n.s. 2.944 2.446 n.s. 2.812 2.848 4.121 ** 3.136 2.762 3.045 
Living in urban areas 0.402 0.533 *** 0.419 0.427 n.s. 0.421 0.396 0.551 *** 0.413 0.431 n.s. 0.418 0.409 0.514 ** 0.426 0.423 0.425 
Per capita montly HH expenditure 238963 262113 n.s. 244940 234904 n.s. 242379 250901 249806 n.s. 245971 263914 n.s. 250746 225635 274421 * 243843 200024 *** 233189 
N 1236 214 1080 370 1450 652 107 557 202 759 584 107 523 168 691 
Only children aged 10–12 (labour market characteristics) 
Has worked in the past 7 days 0.063 0.088 n.s. 0.070 0.056 n.s. 0.067 0.054 0.167 ** 0.071 0.063 n.s. 0.069 0.073 0.019 ** 0.070 0.048 n.s. 0.065 
Working hours 1.468 2.098 n.s. 1.722 1.084 n.s. 1.560 1.117 4.292 ** 1.582 1.406 n.s. 1.536 1.857 0.148 *** 1.868 0.711 n.s. 1.585 
Has done domestic chores 0.902 0.912 n.s. 0.897 0.922 n.s. 0.903 0.889 0.854 n.s. 0.888 0.875 n.s. 0.885 0.916 0.963 n.s. 0.907 0.976 n.s. 0.924 
N 602 102 525 179 704 316 48 268 96 364 286 54 257 83 340 
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Panel B – Considering the interaction between the two channels of violence exposure 
All Boys Girls 
(0,0) (0,1) (1,0) (1,1) (0,0) (0,1) (1,0) (1,1) (0,0) (0,1) (1,0) (1,1) 
Being female 0.474 0.594 0.468 0.424
Speaking Indonesian 0.568 0.750 0.603 0.695 0.568 0.744 0.612 0.676 0.569 0.754 0.593 0.720 
Speaking Portuguese 0.030 0.021 0.020 0.042 0.033 0.000 0.030 0.044 0.028 0.035 0.008 0.040 
HH head is a farmer 0.645 0.396 0.647 0.686 0.658 0.385 0.612 0.676 0.631 0.404 0.686 0.700 
Education grade of HH head 3.107 5.646 3.143 2.000 2.923 5.436 3.075 1.894 3.311 5.789 3.220 2.140 
Education grade of the mother 1.979 4.469 1.444 1.415 1.917 3.974 1.478 1.265 2.047 4.807 1.407 1.620 
Education grade of the father 2.795 5.521 2.937 1.847 2.776 5.179 2.903 1.544 2.815 5.754 2.975 2.260 
Living in urban areas 0.397 0.646 0.421 0.441 0.394 0.667 0.403 0.485 0.401 0.632 0.441 0.380 
Per capita montly HH expenditure 237763 318506 243646 216234 242403 293348 283746 224832 232604 335719 198109 204542 
N 984 96 252 118 518 39 134 68 466 57 118 50 
Only children aged 10-12 (labor market characteristics) 
Has worked in the past 7 days 0.068 0.093 0.042 0.085 0.060 0.235 0.031 0.129 0.078 0.000 0.055 0.036 
Working hours 1.678 2.209 0.625 2.017 1.311 5.588 0.369 3.581 2.078 0.000 0.927 0.286 
Has done domestic chores 0.900 0.860 0.908 0.949 0.896 0.765 0.862 0.903 0.905 0.923 0.964 1.000 
N 482 43 120 59 251 17 65 31 231 26 55 28 
 
Source: Authors’ computations using TLSS (2001). 
Note: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. n.s.= not statistically significant. 
Note: (0,0) = not affected; (0,1) only displaced; (1,0) only house damaged completely; (1,1) affected by both shocks. 
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The economics literature on violent conflict usually employs geographical correlates of 
violence at a suitable level of analysis (village or district) as instruments for self-reported 
conflict information. Unfortunately, the codes for sampled villages and districts in Timor Leste 
were not disclosed in the 2001 TLSS, and we are unable to employ this strategy in the 
analysis. We only have suitable information at the area level. As Timor Leste is divided into 
only five areas, the IV estimator is not reliable at that level. However, we are able to make 
use of the DID estimation outlined above to correct for potential endogeneity problems. To 
this purpose, we take advantage of the panel nature of the data in order to employ a fixed 
effect estimator methodology (FE, hereafter).16 In this way, the effect of a variation of the 
specified covariates is the same for all individuals and over all periods of time, but the 
average effect for each individual i can be different from individual j. The FE estimator allows 
us to wipe out all time-invariant unobserved characteristics, which may be correlated with the 
conflict measure and with our dependent variable. Therefore, we take advantage of the 
longitudinal design of our ‘ad hoc’ panel data in order to eliminate individual unobserved 
heterogeneity. The FE model does not account for time-variant omitted variables. Our 
specification includes thus year dummies that allow us to control for this unobserved time-
variant heterogeneity. 
 
In addition to potential sample biases, the results may also contain identification biases. One 
potential threat to our identification strategy is that trends in education before the 1999 
violence were not ‘parallel’ between affected and not affected group. The violation of this 
assumption would lead to wrong conclusions because pre-existing trends could then be 
driving post-conflict education outcomes. We have examined the average educational grade 
achieved before the 1999 violence of affected and not affected groups of individuals. Figures 
3.3a and 3.3b (see over) show that trends in education levels of affected and not affected 
groups were parallel for cohorts which were not exposed to the 1999 conflict during primary 
school years and were old enough in 1999 to have completed at least their primary school 
level.17 The graphs are done by estimating separate kernel-weighted local polynomial 
regressions of attained grade of education against age using an Epanechnikov kernel. Given 
the in Figures 3.3a and 3.3b, it is unlikely that pre-existing trends may be driving our post-
conflict outcomes. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
16  We think that a FE model is more appropriate in our case than a random effect model as we would have to assume that 
the unobserved component of the individual fixed effects and the other covariates specified in the equation are 
uncorrelated. This assumption is likely to be violated in our specific case and RE estimates would be biased. We have 
performed the Hausman test (1978) that verifies whether the RE estimator is statistically different to FE estimator, and 
cannot reject the null hypothesis of the test that these effects are correlated with the other variables in the model and 
that ultimately the FE model is preferable.  
17  We do not include cohorts born after 1986 as these individuals (our treated cohort) were still in primary school age in 
1999. Therefore their education attainment would be censored.   
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Figure 3.3a Pre-conflict trends in education levels, displacement 
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Source: Authors’ own computations using TLSS (2001). 
 
 
Figure 3.3b Pre-conflict trends in education levels, house completely damaged 
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Source: Authors’ own computations using TLSS (2001). 
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3.2 Identification strategy: the impact of violence on primary school completion 
in 2007 
The second aim of this paper is to analyse the longer term effect of the conflict on primary 
school attainment in 2007. In this section, we focus on the analysis of the impact of the 1999 
violence on educational attainment in 2007, and compare this with the impact of peaks of 
violence during the earlier stages of the conflict on education attainment outcomes among 
boys and girls living in areas of intense conflict. We examine also the overall impact of the  
25 years of conflict on educational outcomes. This analysis allows us to consider the full 
long-term impact of the conflict on educational outcomes of different generations of children 
in Timor Leste.  
 
3.2.1 The educational impact of the 1999 wave of violence 
We exploit variation in the number of killings over time and across districts to identify conflict 
affected individuals. Our intention here is to analyse whether individuals exposed to the 
violence during their primary school age show different primary school completion rates eight 
years after the end of the war, relative to those not affected by the conflict. The outcome 
variable in which we are interested is whether individuals completed primary school in 2007. 
 
Figure 3.4 shows average primary school attainment for all individuals in our sample. The 
graph shows an increasing trend in primary school completion across cohorts and a 
progressive reduction of the gender gap. The gap among the younger cohort (those born 
after 1987) is almost zero. The drop in the curve for the younger cohort confirms the 
presence of significant delays in school attendance. 
 
Figure 3.4 Average primary school completion by gender, 2007 
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Source: Authors’ own computations using TLSS 2007.  
 
For the purpose of this analysis, we use the TLSS 2007 dataset and the HRVD dataset 
contained in the CAVR data publication. As explained in Section 3 (page 14), the HRVD 
dataset contains data on the number of human rights violations occurred since the start of 
the conflict in 1975 until its end in 1999 for each district. The types of violations recorded are 
killings, deaths due to deprivation and disappearances. We use only the number of killings to 
identify years and districts affected by the conflict. We exclude the deaths due to deprivation 
because the districts in which this occurred may very likely not be those where the conflict 
was most intense, but were simply places were the victims were hiding as a consequence of 
escaping from the troops, and died for starvation. In addition, since killings are less likely to 
affect entire families than deaths due to deprivation, there is a lower underreporting bias 
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attached to the former measure relative to the latter one (Silva and Ball 2006). We also 
exclude disappearances as, according to HRVD data, they do not show enough time and 
geographical variation in order to identify individuals more or less exposed to the conflict. We 
believe that the number of killings proxies quite well the intensity of the conflict across time 
and space as their occurrence largely tracked the movements of the Indonesian military 
operations. The other two types of violations do not seem to show the same pattern (Silva 
and Ball 2006). For the same reason, we believe that it proxies quite well the destruction of 
houses and infrastructure and the displacement of people given the way in which the last 
wave of violence occurred (i.e. the scorch-earth technique employed by Indonesian troops as 
they moved towards West Timor). 
 
We define districts and years of ‘high intensity conflict’ as those in which the number of 
killings in that year and district are above a certain threshold. We decided not to use the 
variable as a continuous measure but as a dichotomous one, because its distribution is 
highly right-skewed (as shown in Figure 3.5, which shows a kernel density plot of the number 
of killings). Also, given the nature of the data reported, and the likelihood that there is an 
underreporting in the number of killings as explained in the previous section, the actual value 
is not meaningful in itself. Indeed what we are interested in most is exploiting its variation 
over time and across space. 
 
Figure 3.5 Kernel density plot of number of killings 
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Source: Authors’ own computations using CAVR (2006).  
 
We define the violence intensity threshold as the mean of the number of killings plus one 
standard deviation (as the majority of observations are within one standard deviation of the 
mean, and nearly all within two standard deviations of the mean). The variable that we obtain 
is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the number of killings in a particular year and district is 
above the threshold. In this way, we are able to clearly distinguish years and districts in 
which the conflict was most intense from those in which it was less intense.  
 
We exploit this variation over time and across districts to identify individuals exposed to the 
conflict. The dataset provides information on the year and district of birth of each individual. 
We assume that the district of birth is the district where the child has attended school at the 
time of the violent events in 1999. We then merge the variable that identifies the intensity of 
the conflict in each district and year to the district of birth of each individual. Using the 
information on the year of birth of each individual, we define the six years in which individuals 
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are supposed to have attended primary school.18 We know that, under the Indonesian 
schooling system, children were supposed to enter school by age 7 and completed the first  
6 grades by age 12. We are therefore able to assign the level of violence to each individual 
depending on whether his district of birth and schooling years coincides with a high or low 
conflict intensity district and year.  
 
We have constructed a set of dummies that equal to 1 if the violence is above the threshold 
in the district of birth and in the year in which the individual was supposed to attend his 
primary school. Each dummy will assume zero value if either the district of birth or the 
primary school year is not of high intensity as defined by the threshold above. We have 
obtained a set of six dummies, which indicate whether individuals were exposed or not to the 
conflict in each specific year of primary school. The final variable that we construct is the sum 
of these six dummies. This can range from 0 to 6 if no or all six primary school years were 
exposed to the conflict. The variable is defined as follows:  
 
 
 
where  will assume value 1 if the individual was born in a district of violence and was of 
primary school age in periods in which the conflict was more intense. More specifically, j is 
the district of birth, t is the year of birth and a is the primary school age (from 7 to 12). 
 
Table 3.4 shows the years (in bold and grey) in which, depending on the year of birth, 
individuals were affected by the conflict during the primary school years. The years in which 
the conflict was most intense, as defined by our threshold, are those between 1976–1979, 
then 1983 and 1999. This evidence coincides with what we know on the history of the conflict 
(CAVR 2005).  
 
Table 3.4 Years in which individuals were supposed to attend primary school (by year 
of birth) 
 
    Years in which individuals were supposed to attend primary school  
  Age 7 8 9 10 11 12 
  Grade 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Year of birth               
1963   1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 
1964   1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 
1965   1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 
1966   1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 
1967   1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 
1968   1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 
1969   1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 
1970   1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 
1971   1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 
1972   1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 
1973   1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 
1974   1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 
1975   1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 
1976   1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 
1977   1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 
1978   1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 
1979   1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 
                                                 
18  These are the years in which an individual is ‘supposed’ to attend school and not the years in which he actually 
attended as unfortunately we do not have this information. The existence of a delay in school means that the ‘supposed’ 
years might not coincide with the ‘actual’ years. However, given the way in which we identify our control and treatment 
groups we do not expect this difference to affect our results.  
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1980   1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 
1981   1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 
1982   1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 
1983   1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 
1984   1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 
1985   1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 
1986   1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 
1987   1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
1988   1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
1989   1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
1990   1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
1991   1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
1992   1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
Source: Authors’ own computations. 
 
Table 3.5 shows the distribution of the violence variable by year of birth and district. It shows 
which are the cohorts and the districts exposed to the violence. Each cell shows the number 
of primary school years exposed to the conflict.  
 
In order to estimate the effect of the 1999 violence on school completion in 2007 we include 
in our sample individuals born between 1977 and 1992. Those born in 1992 are supposed to 
have started school in 1999, so at the end of the conflict. We include individuals born up until 
1992 as they are 15 years old in 2007 and so supposed to have completed at least primary 
school. We do not include individuals born after this year as they might have not completed 
primary school yet.19 As Tables 3.4 and 3.5 show, individuals born between 1977 and 1986 
should not have been affected by violence during their primary school years.  
 
Table 3.5 Number of years of exposure to the conflict in each district and year 
 
 
 
Source: Authors’ own computations using CAVR (2006).  
 
                                                 
19   According to our data, there is a significant percentage of individuals in our sample (the 39 per cent, mostly born in 1991 
and 1992) who are still attending primary school despite being old enough to have completed primary school. This 
testifies the high delay in school. We are aware of a potential right censoring in our dependent variable but we believe 
that our main results would remain unchanged if we were able to account for this. In addition in our empirical strategy 
we are going to provide some insights on this issue by looking at the separate effect between younger and older 
individuals.  
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3.2.2 The educational impact of earlier peaks of violence and of the overall conflict 
Our second objective is to analyse the effect of the early years of the conflict on school 
completion in 2007 in order to investigate whether there are any significant differences in the 
educational impact of the conflict in later and in earlier waves of the conflict. This will allow us 
to understand the full impact of 25 years of violent conflict on several generations of 
Timorese children, as well as analyse whether violence exercised at different points of the 
conflict (and driven by different objectives) may have had different effects on human capital 
outcomes.  
 
Aside from 1999, the Timor Leste conflict was very intense between 1975 and 1979 and 
again in 1983. According to our definition of violence intensity, the other years up until 1999 
were of very low intensity. In order to analyse the impact of earlier peaks of violence, we 
focus our analysis on a sample of individuals born between 1968 and 1984. Those born in 
1968 were supposed to have started their primary school in 1975, so exactly at the start of 
the conflict. Even though those born between 1963 and 1967 had at least one year of 
primary school exposed to the conflict, we do not consider those born before 1968 because 
the schooling system was very different before the Indonesian troops invaded Dili in 1975. 
We also do not include individuals born between 1985 and 1986 as these were between  
13 and 14 in 2007. Given the significant delay in school entry in Timor Leste, those born in 
1985 and 1986 could still have been affected by the violence in 1999.20 We have estimated 
specifications including these individuals. The results are mostly unchanged, so we decided 
not to include them, but they are available upon request.  
 
One interesting issue when analyzing the effect of the first years of the violence, is that 
individuals could have been affected by the violence for more than one year, as violence was 
highly intense between 1975 and 1979 and in 1983. So, differently from the analysis of 1999 
violence, we estimate here a model in which the measure of violence intensity is a 
continuous variable. This variable allows us to examine the effects of whether the individual 
was exposed or not to the violence, and it also informs us on the effects of exposure to 
violence during a number of primary school years. This analysis will provide insights not only 
on the effect of being exposed or not to violence, but also on the length of exposure to the 
conflict.  
 
Finally, we assess also the effect of the whole conflict on school attainment in 2007. To this 
purpose, we take into account a sample of individuals born between 1968 and 1992. This will 
allow us to calculate the average educational effect of exposure to any period of the conflict 
for boys and girls in different age groups.  
 
3.2.3 Empirical strategy and descriptive statistics 
In order to estimate the effect of the conflict on primary school completion in 2007, we 
estimate the following equation:  
 
 
 
where  is the dependent variable and refers to primary school completion for individual i 
born in district j and in year t. The variable we use to identify school completion is a binary 
variable equal to 1 if the individual attained grade six or more of schooling and 0 otherwise. 
The main reason to use a binary variable as the dependent variable in place of a continuous 
one up to grade six is that this variable allows us to detect peaks in school achievements 
mostly at grade six, given that it is the completion year of primary school (Shemyakina 2011). 
                                                 
20  We have conducted some placebo tests which will show that this cohorts were not affected neither by the early years of 
the conflict nor by the 1999 violence.  
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In our estimated model, all standard errors are clustered at the year and district of birth level. 
The term  is a vector of household characteristics. In order to control for any household 
specific characteristic, we included as explanatory variables the education of the household 
head (which should be related to pre-war characteristics of the household) and whether 
he/she is a farmer. We interpret these variables as proxies for the income level of the family. 
We control for whether the respondent is female, but have also estimated the above model 
for boys and girls, separately. The term  identifies individuals exposed to the conflict.  is 
our parameter of interest, indicating whether being affected by the conflict (or whether an 
additional year of exposure to the conflict) during primary school affects the probability of 
primary school completion after the conflict ended as compared to an individual that was not 
exposed to the conflict during his primary school age. The two parameters  and  are, 
respectively, dummies for the districts of birth and the years of birth. The term  represents 
district-specific linear trends.21  
 
We provide some descriptive statistics on the outcome variable among exposed and not 
exposed individuals. Table 3.6 shows the average primary school completion in 2007 for 
individuals exposed and not exposed to the conflict as identified by our measure of violence 
intensity discussed above. We look at these averages for the three samples we consider in 
our analysis: boys and girls separately (panel A), exposure to violence during the first three 
grades of primary school (panel B) and exposure to violence during the last three grades of 
primary school (panel C).  
 
Table 3.6 Average primary school completion in 2007, by exposed and not exposed 
 
Panel A 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5) (6)  
 Not Exp,All Exp,All ttest Not Exp,Boys Exp,Boys ttest Not Exp,Girls Exp, Girls ttest 
          
Sample 1977-1992 0.725 0.724 n.s 0.752 0.709 ** 0.698 0.739 ** 
 (0.006) (0.013)  (0.008) (0.020)  (0.008) (0.017)  
Sample 1968-1984 0.624 0.572 *** 0.680 0.658 n.s. 0.569 0.472 *** 
 (0.007) (0.023)  (0.010) (0.032)  (0.009) (0.034)  
Sample 1968-1992 0.679 0.674 n.s 0.720 0.692 ** 0.636 0.654 n.s. 
 (0.005) (0.009)  (0.007) (0.013)  (0.006) (0.013)  
 
Panel B– Average primary school completion in 2007, by exposed and not exposed in first three grades 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5) (6)  
 Not Exp,All Exp,All ttest Not Exp,Boys Exp,Boys ttest Not Exp,Girls Exp, Girls ttest 
 b/se b/se  b/se b/se  b/se b/se  
Sample 1977–1992 0.731 0.692 ** 0.751 0.673 *** 0.709 0.711 n.s. 
 (0.005) (0.019)  (0.008) (0.029)  (0.007) (0.025)  
Sample 1968–1984 0.623 0.571 *** 0.679 0.659 n.s. 0.567 0.471 *** 
 (0.007) (0.024)  (0.010) (0.032)  (0.010) (0.035)  
Sample 1968–1992 0.687 0.637 *** 0.723 0.666 *** 0.650 0.605 ** 
 (0.004) (0.012)  (0.006) (0.016)  (0.006) (0.016)  
 
Panel C– Average primary school completion in 2007, by exposed and not exposed in last three grades 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5) (6)  
 Not Exp,All Exp,All ttest Not Exp,Boys Exp,Boys ttest Not Exp,Girls Exp, Girls ttest 
 b/se b/se  b/se b/se  b/se b/se  
Sample 1977–1992 0.719 0.759 ** 0.738 0.749 n.s. 0.700 0.769 *** 
 (0.005) (0.018)  (0.008) (0.028)  (0.007) (0.023)  
Sample 1968–1984 0.622 0.524 *** 0.680 0.634 n.s. 0.564 0.385 *** 
 (0.007) (0.037)  (0.010) (0.051)  (0.009) (0.054)  
Sample 1968–1992 0.675 0.690 n.s. 0.711 0.713 n.s. 0.638 0.664 n.s. 
 (0.004) (0.014)  (0.006) (0.021)  (0.006) (0.019)  
 
Source: Authors’ computations using TLSS (2007). 
                                                 
21  We have also estimated our equation including either cubic district trend or square roots district trend to account for a 
non linear trend across districts. We do not find any difference in the estimates and therefore we only show the results 
which include a linear district trend.  
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If we concentrate on the first sample (1977–1992), we see that exposed boys show a lower 
attainment rate than not exposed ones, while the contrary is true for girls. Interestingly 
however, these differences seems to be stronger for boys affected during the first three 
grades (younger), and for girls affected in the last three grades (older). Looking at these 
averages over the sample 1968–1984, we notice that exposed individuals show a lower 
completion rate than those not exposed to violence. This difference is particularly clear for 
girls, mostly for those exposed to violence during the last three grades of primary school 
(older girls).  
 
3.2.4 Potential sample biases and identification concerns 
One concern with our empirical strategy is whether there is a systematic relation between the 
intensity of the violence across districts and pre-conflict education levels at the district level 
(i.e. whether pre-conflict education conditions predict the likelihood of conflict occurrence in 
specific districts). The existence of time-varying unobservables which are correlated with 
both the outcome and the conflict variables would bias our results. The inclusion of district 
effects allows us however to account for time-invariant differences in education levels across 
districts. By including district specific time trends, we account for any difference in trends 
across districts and hence for any time-varying characteristics in a given district.  
 
In order to check whether there is a correlation between pre-conflict levels and trends in 
education and conflict occurrence in specific districts, we have in addition carried placebo 
tests on cohorts that supposedly were not exposed to the conflict during their primary school 
age.  
 
As the geographical variation of the conflict differs between the early years and the 1999 
year, we have estimated two separate models by defining different war districts and ‘placebo’ 
cohorts. On the basis of the definition outlined above of affected or not affected districts (see 
Table 3.5) ,we have constructed two war district dummies equal to 1 if the individual district 
of birth is in one of the district affected by the conflict during the early years of the violence or 
during the 1999 violence, respectively, and zero otherwise.22  
 
The first placebo test concentrates on the early years of the conflict. Unfortunately, we are 
not able to look at pre-conflict cohorts because, as explained above, the cohort born before 
1968 was exposed to a different school system. Therefore, we define as exposed ‘placebo’ 
cohorts those born between 1977 and 1980 and compare them to those born between 1981 
and 1984.23 As a further check, we have also analysed violence exposure for cohorts born 
between 1977 and 1981, and compared them to those born between 1982 and 1986.24 We 
estimated a simple difference-in-differences model in which we focus on the coefficient over 
the interaction term between the war cohort and war district dummies. We expect to find no 
effect of ‘exposure’ of cohorts who were not of primary school age, but were born in districts 
affected by the conflict, on their primary school attainment in 2007. We have done the same 
analysis with a focus on the 1999 violence. Those born between 1982 and 1986 were not of 
school age in 1999. We compared their exposure to that of those born between 1977 and 
1981 in war and non war districts.  
 
The results in Table 3.7 show that cohorts who were not supposed to be of primary school 
age during the conflict years but born in conflict affected districts do not show a different 
                                                 
22  The districts most affected by violence in the earlier years of the conflict are Baucau, Lautem, Viqueque, Ainaro, 
Manufahi, Manatuto, Aileu,Dili, Ermera, Bobonaro. Those most affected by the 1999 violence are Dili, Ermera, 
Bobonaro, Covalima, Liquica, Oecussi (see Table 3.5).  
23  We this we must bear in mind that the ‘truly’ exposed cohorts to the early years of the conflict are those born between 
1968 and 1976. So, in our placebo test, we look at the cohorts immediately following the ‘truly’ exposed ones.  
24  Refer to Tables 3.4 and 3.5 to verify that these cohorts were supposed not to have any of their primary school years 
exposed to the conflict.  
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primary school completion rate as compared to the same cohorts born in unaffected districts. 
This gives support to the fact that our identifying assumptions are satisfied.25 
 
Table 3.7 Placebo test for differences in trends in education levels  
 
 Sample 1977–1984 Sample 1977–1986 Sample 1977–1986 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
 All Boys Girls All Boys Girls All Boys Girls 
WardA* 
coh 1977–1980 
0.062 0.070 0.052       
 (0.047) (0.054) (0.061)       
WardA* 
coh 1977–1981 
   0.021 0.059 -0.018    
    (0.044) (0.048) (0.058)    
WardB* 
coh 1982–1986 
      -0.015 0.044 -0.078 
       (0.043) (0.050) (0.054) 
WardA  0.014 0.031 -0.003 0.040 0.014 0.063    
 (0.031) (0.032) (0.043) (0.030) (0.029) (0.043)    
WardB       -0.051 -0.037 -0.060 
       (0.031) (0.040) (0.038) 
YearBirth= 1978 0.047 0.064 0.030 0.047 0.065 0.031 0.049 0.066 0.034 
 (0.053) (0.067) (0.065) (0.054) (0.068) (0.066) (0.052) (0.071) (0.059) 
YearBirth= 1979 0.075* 0.100* 0.045 0.075 0.100* 0.046 0.074 0.102* 0.043 
 (0.045) (0.052) (0.070) (0.046) (0.054) (0.070) (0.045) (0.056) (0.070) 
YearBirth= 1980 0.106** 0.143** 0.068 0.101* 0.138** 0.065 0.106* 0.143** 0.072 
 (0.053) (0.062) (0.057) (0.055) (0.065) (0.058) (0.057) (0.070) (0.057) 
YearBirth= 1981 0.112** 0.095 0.125* 0.064 0.039 0.086 0.068 0.045 0.089* 
 (0.054) (0.066) (0.067) (0.050) (0.065) (0.053) (0.051) (0.070) (0.052) 
YearBirth= 1982 0.131** 0.159** 0.099 0.095* 0.145** 0.046 0.090* 0.080 0.102 
 (0.052) (0.062) (0.065) (0.054) (0.064) (0.068) (0.052) (0.064) (0.063) 
YearBirth= 1983 0.164*** 0.181*** 0.142** 0.131** 0.167** 0.094 0.126** 0.102 0.155** 
 (0.056) (0.062) (0.071) (0.056) (0.065) (0.069) (0.053) (0.068) (0.062) 
YearBirth= 1984 0.207*** 0.235*** 0.175*** 0.172*** 0.221*** 0.123* 0.170*** 0.157** 0.187*** 
 (0.054) (0.066) (0.066) (0.056) (0.069) (0.070) (0.055) (0.072) (0.064) 
YearBirth= 1985    0.182*** 0.220*** 0.142* 0.178*** 0.154** 0.204*** 
    (0.059) (0.066) (0.078) (0.051) (0.064) (0.063) 
YearBirth= 1986    0.237*** 0.253*** 0.222*** 0.234*** 0.187*** 0.283*** 
    (0.052) (0.061) (0.066) (0.048) (0.066) (0.057) 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 2542 1255 1287 3402 1699 1703 3402 1699 1703 
Source: Authors’ computations using TLSS 2007. 
Note: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01; Cluster-Robust standard errors in brackets. 
Note: WardA is =1 if individual’s district of birth is found to be a conflict affected district during the early years of conflict (1975–
1979 and 1983) as defined by our violence measure. WardB is =1 if individual’s district of birth is found to be a conflict affected 
district during the 1999 violence as defined by our violence measure.  
 
 
4  Empirical results 
 
4.1 School attendance in 2001 
Table 4.1 shows the results for the impact of the two channels of violence exposure in 1999 
on school attendance in the 1999/00 and 2000/01 academic years. As discussed previously, 
we are mostly interested in looking at the effects of the violence on school attendance in the 
post-conflict academic year (i.e. 2000/01). Table 4.1 reports the estimates from a fixed effect 
model applied to our ‘ad hoc’ panel dataset derived from the TLSS2001. For sake of 
simplicity, we have estimated a linear probability model. The analysis is disaggregated by 
gender and age groups. The results highlighted in bold are our main coefficients of interest. 
 
                                                 
25  There could still be unobservable errors in the identification of districts most affected by the violence. We have used an 
instrumental variable methodology to estimate the impact of violence on school completion in order to minimise the bias 
and found no difference in the results discussed in the sections below.  
 35 
 
Table 4.1 Impact of 1999 violence on school attendance in 2001 (fixed effect model) 
 
Panel A – Displaced 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
 All Boys Girls All Boys Girls All Boys Girls 
 8-11 8-11 8-11 8-9 8-9 8-9 10-11 10-11 10-11 
y2 0.071*** 0.070*** 0.072*** 0.148*** 0.137*** 0.160*** 0.002 0.009 -0.005 
 (0.017) (0.023) (0.022) (0.024) (0.033) (0.034) (0.018) (0.025) (0.023) 
y3 0.240*** 0.240*** 0.241*** 0.345*** 0.313*** 0.383*** 0.147*** 0.173*** 0.116*** 
 (0.020) (0.023) (0.027) (0.027) (0.034) (0.041) (0.020) (0.028) (0.029) 
c1y2 -0.184*** -0.199*** -0.172*** -0.198*** -0.212*** -0.185** -0.188*** -0.209** -0.170** 
 (0.045) (0.056) (0.060) (0.047) (0.065) (0.074) (0.061) (0.088) (0.077) 
c1y3 -0.127*** -0.111** -0.141*** -0.182*** -0.138* -0.233*** -0.089** -0.106* -0.066 
 (0.037) (0.049) (0.048) (0.053) (0.077) (0.071) (0.038) (0.055) (0.055) 
N 2898 1536 1362 1398 753 645 1500 783 717 
r2 0.151 0.155 0.146 0.217 0.199 0.241 0.110 0.130 0.091 
Note: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
 
Panel B – House completely damaged 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
 All Boys Girls All Boys Girls All Boys Girls 
 8-11 8-11 8-11 8-9 8-9 8-9 10-11 10-11 10-11 
y2 0.068*** 0.071*** 0.065*** 0.133*** 0.137*** 0.129*** 0.008 0.005 0.011 
 (0.017) (0.023) (0.021) (0.025) (0.033) (0.031) (0.018) (0.025) (0.024) 
y3 0.214*** 0.220*** 0.206*** 0.301*** 0.284*** 0.323*** 0.133*** 0.157*** 0.108*** 
 (0.019) (0.023) (0.027) (0.028) (0.035) (0.042) (0.020) (0.029) (0.028) 
c2y2 -0.101** -0.109** -0.091* -0.075 -0.137* -0.012 -0.129*** -0.077 -0.196*** 
 (0.042) (0.054) (0.054) (0.051) (0.070) (0.070) (0.048) (0.067) (0.059) 
c2y3 0.027 0.016 0.040 0.046 0.027 0.061 0.004 0.014 -0.016 
 (0.041) (0.051) (0.052) (0.059) (0.077) (0.078) (0.037) (0.052) (0.056) 
N 2898 1536 1362 1398 753 645 1500 783 717 
r2 0.147 0.153 0.142 0.209 0.198 0.226 0.110 0.122 0.106 
Note: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
 
Panel C – Combining the two channel of violence exposure 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
 All Boys Girls All Boys Girls All Boys Girls 
 8-11 8-11 8-11 8-9 8-9 8-9 10-11 10-11 10-11 
y2 0.074*** 0.076*** 0.072*** 0.142*** 0.145*** 0.138*** 0.014 0.011 0.018 
 (0.018) (0.024) (0.023) (0.026) (0.036) (0.034) (0.019) (0.026) (0.025) 
y3 0.222*** 0.231*** 0.212*** 0.320*** 0.306*** 0.338*** 0.136*** 0.159*** 0.110*** 
 (0.021) (0.024) (0.030) (0.029) (0.037) (0.047) (0.021) (0.030) (0.031) 
c1y2 -0.060 -0.076 -0.050 -0.070 -0.086 -0.058 -0.079 -0.122 -0.064 
 (0.049) (0.060) (0.062) (0.057) (0.068) (0.087) (0.069) (0.109) (0.085) 
c1y3 -0.085* -0.154*** -0.041 -0.153** -0.248*** -0.098 -0.039 -0.048 -0.020 
 (0.047) (0.059) (0.065) (0.064) (0.070) (0.100) (0.055) (0.110) (0.065) 
c2y2 -0.015 -0.030 0.002 0.027 -0.039 0.084 -0.062 -0.011 -0.130** 
 (0.050) (0.068) (0.057) (0.063) (0.091) (0.077) (0.053) (0.076) (0.058) 
c2y3 0.087* 0.045 0.134** 0.114 0.036 0.173** 0.052 0.065 0.028 
 (0.050) (0.064) (0.058) (0.072) (0.096) (0.086) (0.044) (0.063) (0.057) 
c1c2y2 -0.233** -0.174 -0.296** -0.282*** -0.193 -0.364** -0.156 -0.116 -0.158 
 (0.094) (0.114) (0.123) (0.104) (0.136) (0.152) (0.122) (0.171) (0.151) 
c1c2y3 -0.133* 0.037 -0.304*** -0.122 0.166 -0.413*** -0.123 -0.129 -0.119 
 (0.077) (0.103) (0.087) (0.114) (0.158) (0.121) (0.075) (0.128) (0.098) 
N 2898 1536 1362 1398 753 645 1500 783 717 
r2 0.162 0.164 0.163 0.228 0.217 0.257 0.122 0.134 0.117 
Source: Authors’ computations using TLSS 2001. 
Note: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01; Cluster-Robust standard errors in brackets. 
 
 
The results show a negative and significant impact of displacement on school attendance in 
2001 for the overall sample. The impact on girls is larger than that on boys but the difference 
is not statistically significant (Panel A, Table 4.1). We observe also that household 
displacement is associated with more substantial decreases in primary school attendance 
among younger individuals. This effect is stronger for girls (columns 4-6). Among older 
individuals, boys seem to be more affected than girls. We do not find any statistically 
significant effect of house destruction on primary school attendance in 2001 (Panel B, table 
4.1), in line with the descriptive analysis in Section 3.2.  
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The impact of these two channels of violence exposure becomes clearer once we estimate a 
triple interaction equation in order to isolate the impact for those that have been only 
displaced, those with only the house damaged and those affected by both shocks (Panel C, 
Table 4.1). We find that being affected only by displacement decreases school attendance 
on average, with stronger effects for boys. Interestingly, exposure to house destruction is 
associated with increases in school attendance among girls. Individuals affected by both 
shocks simultaneously reduce their school attendance on average, with girls being more 
severely affected. All these effects are stronger for younger individuals. 
 
These results suggest that different violence channels affect school attendance in different 
ways. Displacement is the most disruptive channel in term of consequences on children’s 
school attendance, since all household assets are likely to have been lost (Ibáñez and Moya 
2009). The negative impact of displacement on the younger cohort is larger among girls, 
suggesting that displaced households remove their girls from school, possibly due to fear of 
their vulnerability to violence (see UNESCO 2011). The negative impact of violence on 
education among the older cohort of children is stronger for boys than girls. These boys 
would have been removed from school in order to participate in economic activities within or 
outside the household (see Table 3.3). It is possible that older boys may have joined the 
rebellion as fighters. However, the available data does not allow us to test this hypothesis. 
The negative impact of the conflict on older boys is further emphasized by the negative effect 
of violence exposure on the increase of grade deficit rates among older boys (Table 4.2, 
Panel C, column 8). 
 
House destruction would have affected household wealth but perhaps less so if the 
household was able to keep other assets and live with friends, neighbors or relatives. The 
impact of the destruction of the house seems also to be associated with improvements in 
primary school attendance of girls. This may well be because households that experienced 
the destruction of their house may have joined relatives or friends in urban areas or areas of 
better access to education infrastructure. Girls may have benefited more from relocation if 
boys remained behind with their fathers or mothers (perhaps to continuing cultivating the 
fields or attending to cattle and other assets). These are, however, only speculative remarks 
since we are not able to test these hypotheses with the available datasets. 
 
Table 4.2 Impact of 1999 violence on grade deficit in 2001 (fixed effect model) 
 
Panel A – Displaced 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
 All Boys Girls All Boys Girls All Boys Girls 
 8-11 8-11 8-11 8-9 8-9 8-9 10-11 10-11 10-11 
y2 0.211*** 0.195*** 0.228*** 0.238*** 0.231*** 0.247*** 0.194*** 0.173*** 0.217*** 
 (0.029) (0.037) (0.038) (0.040) (0.053) (0.062) (0.035) (0.046) (0.046) 
y3 0.388*** 0.369*** 0.409*** 0.458*** 0.440*** 0.481*** 0.347*** 0.327*** 0.370*** 
 (0.039) (0.047) (0.050) (0.055) (0.071) (0.075) (0.044) (0.056) (0.058) 
c1y2 -0.037 0.042 -0.098 -0.108* -0.040 -0.167** 0.023 0.121 -0.045 
 (0.062) (0.086) (0.072) (0.062) (0.102) (0.077) (0.089) (0.138) (0.102) 
c1y3 -0.051 -0.054 -0.057 -0.132 -0.201 -0.081 0.001 0.085 -0.059 
 (0.080) (0.097) (0.112) (0.115) (0.144) (0.177) (0.092) (0.129) (0.125) 
N 1644 837 807 642 336 306 1002 501 501 
r2 0.195 0.193 0.200 0.234 0.237 0.242 0.173 0.170 0.178 
Note: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
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Panel B – House completely damaged 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
 All Boys Girls All Boys Girls All Boys Girls 
 8-11 8-11 8-11 8-9 8-9 8-9 10-11 10-11 10-11 
y2 0.207*** 0.213*** 0.200*** 0.202*** 0.211*** 0.192*** 0.209*** 0.214*** 0.205*** 
 (0.031) (0.040) (0.038) (0.039) (0.052) (0.059) (0.038) (0.049) (0.048) 
y3 0.359*** 0.343*** 0.376*** 0.399*** 0.356*** 0.449*** 0.333*** 0.333*** 0.333*** 
 (0.040) (0.048) (0.052) (0.053) (0.068) (0.078) (0.047) (0.063) (0.060) 
c2y2 -0.010 -0.054 0.037 0.058 0.062 0.058 -0.051 -0.117 0.024 
 (0.056) (0.075) (0.081) (0.072) (0.115) (0.109) (0.076) (0.096) (0.102) 
c2y3 0.092 0.086 0.098 0.145 0.235 0.051 0.061 0.008 0.124 
 (0.073) (0.091) (0.106) (0.119) (0.180) (0.171) (0.088) (0.107) (0.123) 
N 1644 837 807 642 336 306 1002 501 501 
r2 0.197 0.196 0.201 0.234 0.240 0.237 0.176 0.174 0.181 
Note: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
 
Panel C – Combining the two channel of violence exposure 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
 All Boys Girls All Boys Girls All Boys Girls 
 8-11 8-11 8-11 8-9 8-9 8-9 10-11 10-11 10-11 
y2 0.222*** 0.216*** 0.227*** 0.221*** 0.203*** 0.242*** 0.222*** 0.225*** 0.219*** 
 (0.034) (0.042) (0.042) (0.045) (0.059) (0.070) (0.040) (0.052) (0.053) 
y3 0.370*** 0.356*** 0.386*** 0.404*** 0.365*** 0.452*** 0.350*** 0.350*** 0.351*** 
 (0.042) (0.051) (0.055) (0.057) (0.074) (0.082) (0.050) (0.065) (0.065) 
c1y2 -0.114* -0.035 -0.168*** -0.096 0.047 -0.242*** -0.139** -0.225*** -0.108 
 (0.061) (0.092) (0.057) (0.075) (0.126) (0.070) (0.065) (0.052) (0.090) 
c1y3 -0.085 -0.128 -0.063 -0.029 -0.052 -0.014 -0.184* -0.350*** -0.129 
 (0.105) (0.140) (0.128) (0.148) (0.187) (0.219) (0.104) (0.065) (0.137) 
c2y2 -0.059 -0.110 0.003 0.092 0.150 0.025 -0.148** -0.258*** -0.011 
 (0.053) (0.082) (0.078) (0.089) (0.135) (0.139) (0.069) (0.089) (0.095) 
c2y3 0.095 0.070 0.126 0.283** 0.400* 0.148 -0.017 -0.117 0.107 
 (0.084) (0.112) (0.109) (0.137) (0.205) (0.190) (0.103) (0.127) (0.135) 
c1c2y2 0.229 0.241 0.188 -0.074 -0.400** 0.197 0.428** 0.713*** 0.173 
 (0.141) (0.187) (0.178) (0.154) (0.169) (0.216) (0.173) (0.196) (0.234) 
c1c2y3 0.036 0.140 -0.050 -0.444* -0.712** -0.253 0.396** 0.753*** 0.125 
 (0.194) (0.221) (0.264) (0.264) (0.274) (0.375) (0.190) (0.218) (0.272) 
N 1644 837 807 642 336 306 1002 501 501 
r2 0.201 0.201 0.206 0.249 0.270 0.252 0.185 0.200 0.184 
Source: Authors’ computations using TLSS 2001. 
Note: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01; Cluster-Robust standard errors in brackets. 
 
 
4.2 School completion in 2007 
Table 4.3 reports the estimates of our analysis of the effect of the 1999 violence on primary 
school completion in 2007 over the sample of individuals born between 1977 and 1992. 
Column 1 shows the estimated results for the whole sample. 
 
Table 4.3 Effect of 1999 violence on primary school completion in 2007, Sample  
1977–1992 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 All Boys Girls All Boys Girls 
 b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se 
Exp in prim school -0.041 -0.183*** 0.104**    
 (0.029) (0.044) (0.047)    
Exp in grade 1-3    -0.069* -0.210*** 0.080 
    (0.038) (0.056) (0.064) 
Exp in grade 4-6    -0.040 -0.183*** 0.105** 
    (0.029) (0.044) (0.048) 
Year fe Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
District fe Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
District trend Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 6676 3383 3293 6676 3383 3293 
Source: Authors’ computations using TLSS 2007. 
Note: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01; Cluster-Robust standard errors in brackets. Sample: 1977-1992. 
 
The coefficient for the violence measure is negative but not statistically significant. However, 
once we split the sample between boys and girls (columns 2 and 3), we find that being 
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exposed to the violence in one of the years in which children were supposed to have 
attended primary school affects negatively the probability of primary school completion of 
boys and positively the probability of primary school completion among girls. The results 
show that boys exposed to the violence during their primary school years are 18 percentage 
points less likely to have completed primary school several years after the violence. On the 
contrary, we observe that girls exposed to the violence are 10 percentage points more likely 
to complete primary school in 2007. These results are in line with the descriptive evidence 
discussed in Section 3, and with some of the results obtained for 2001: boys seem to have 
been more negatively affected by the conflict in Timor Leste than girls. We have also 
disaggregated the results across age groups in order to examine whether being exposed to 
violence at the start of the primary school (first three grades) or later (last three grades) 
makes a difference in terms of primary school completion. Columns 4-6 in Table 4.3 show 
that the coefficients are particularly strong for younger and older boys (the coefficient is 
slightly higher for younger boys) and for older girls. 
 
We now turn to the effect of peaks of violence in the earlier years of the conflict on primary 
school completion observed in 2007. Table 4.4 shows the results over the sample of 
individuals born between 1968 and 1984. Our variable of interest is still defined as a dummy 
which identifies whether the individuals were exposed or not to the conflict. As before, the 
effects are negative for boys and positive for girls, although the coefficients are not 
statistically significant. We find, however, a statistically significant negative effect of violence 
on boys attending the last three grades of primary school.  
 
Table 4.4 Effect of early years of conflict on primary school completion in 2007, 
Sample 1968–1984  
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 All Boys Girls All Boys Girls 
 b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se 
Exp in prim school -0.012 -0.035 0.020    
 (0.024) (0.031) (0.038)    
Exp in grade 1-3    -0.017 -0.031 0.006 
    (0.018) (0.023) (0.031) 
Exp in grade 4-6    -0.041 -0.065* -0.017 
    (0.027) (0.034) (0.040) 
Year fe Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
District fe Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
District trend Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 5195 2625 2570 5195 2625 2570 
Source: Authors’ computations using TLSS 2007. 
Note: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01; Cluster-Robust standard errors in brackets. Sample: 1968-1984. 
 
In Table 4.5, we repeat the estimations reported in Table 4.4 but use a continuous variable to 
measure exposure to violence. As discussed in Section 3, this is because during the earlier 
stages of the conflict, individuals could have been affected by violence for more than one 
year. Our variable of interest now is defined as the number of years of exposure to the 
conflict during primary school (ranging from 0 to 6). This measure not only tells us whether 
being exposed to the conflict affects primary school completion, but also informs us on the 
effect of an additional year of exposure to violence. Column 1-3 in Table 4.5 show the results 
of the re-estimated model. We find that an additional year of exposure on primary school 
completion in 2007 decreases school completion for all individuals. However, the negative 
effect is statistically significant only for boys (column 2). Again we find that exposure to 
violence has a particularly negative impact on school completion of boys, particularly those 
attending the last three years of primary school (grades 4 to 6) (column 5). We do not find a 
significant effect for girls.  
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Table 4.5 Effect of early years of conflict on primary school completion in 2007, 
Sample 1968–1984  
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 All Boys Girls All Boys Girls 
 b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se 
N Ys Exp in prim 
school 
-0.026** -0.030** -0.021    
 (0.011) (0.014) (0.017)    
N Ys Exp in grade 
1-3 
   -0.021* -0.022 -0.018 
    (0.012) (0.016) (0.020) 
N Ys Exp in grade 
4-6 
   -0.040** -0.054** -0.031 
    (0.018) (0.021) (0.028) 
Year fe Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
District fe Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
District trend Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 5195 2625 2570 5195 2625 2570 
Source: Authors’ computations using TLSS 2007. 
Note: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01; Cluster-Robust standard errors in brackets. Sample: 1968-1984. 
 
Finally, Table 4.6 reports the estimates for the effect of the whole conflict on primary school 
completion in 2007. The sample includes individuals born between 1968 and 1992. The 
results show the average effect of exposure to both the first years of the conflict and the 
1999 violence. Since we are looking at both periods of violence, we only look at the effect of 
being exposed or not during primary school years in order not to confound the results.26 The 
results show that boys exposed to the conflict in any period are 7.4 percentage points less 
likely to complete primary school. The effect on girls is positive but both the size and the 
significance are quite small. We find once more that the overall conflict has a strong and 
negative effect on primary school completion among boys attending the last three years of 
primary school.   
 
Table 4.6 Effect of entire conflict on primary school completion in 2007, Sample 1968–
1992 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 All Boys Girls All Boys Girls 
Exp in prim school -0.012 -0.074*** 0.055*    
 (0.020) (0.027) (0.030)    
Exp in grade 1-3    -0.006 -0.035 0.031 
    (0.019) (0.023) (0.029) 
Exp in grade 4-6    -0.019 -0.075*** 0.044 
    (0.019) (0.027) (0.029) 
Year fe Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
District fe Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
District trend Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 9329 4753 4576 9329 4753 4576 
Source: Authors’ computations using TLSS 2007. 
Note: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01; Cluster-Robust standard errors in brackets. Sample: 1968-1992. 
 
The results indicate that the 1999 wave of violence, peaks of violence in the earlier stages of 
the conflict and the overall conflict have had very different effects on boys and girls and on 
younger and older children. Girls in general do not seem to have been severely affected by 
the conflict in Timor Leste and show even small educational improvements following the 
1999 events. This result would suggest that while girls have been negatively hit by exposure 
to the early years of the conflict when their attendance was still very low, they seem to have 
recovered over the years and their catching up process does not seem to have been 
hindered by the 1999 violence. The net effect of the whole conflict on girls in areas of 
violence is not different from the effect on girls that were not exposed to violence.  
                                                 
26  So we do not estimate our model including the number of years of exposure to the conflict as explanatory variable.  
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Boys have been negatively affected by the conflict in Timor Leste at all stages. We find a 
negative effect of the conflict on primary school completion among both younger and older 
boys following the 1999 violence, and among older boys following the earlier peaks of 
violence and across the whole conflict duration. Table 3.3 suggests that boys affected by 
violence in Timor Leste tend to work more and for longer hours. This is in line with findings in 
the literature on household coping strategies in face of adverse shocks. The use of children 
as a form of economic security mechanism is widely reported in the development economics 
literature (see Dasgupta 1993; Nugent and Gillaspy 1983), as is the resort to child labor as a 
form of compensating for low-incomes (e.g. Duryea, Lam and Levinson 2007). Children that 
are needed to replace labor are removed from school. In areas of violent conflict, households 
may decide to replace dead, injured, absent or disabled adult workers with children (if these 
have not become fighters as well). Akresh and de Walque (2009), Merrouche (2006), 
Shemyakina (2006) and Swee (2009) put forward this mechanism as a possible explanation 
for the reduction in education attainment and enrolment observed in contexts of civil war. In a 
recent paper, Rodriguez and Sanchez (2009) test directly the effect of war of child labor and 
find that violent attacks in Colombian municipalities by armed groups have increased 
significantly the probability of school drop-out and increased the inclusion of children in the 
labor market. These effects may have intergenerational consequences as their children are 
likely to also remain trapped in a cycle of low human capital and low productivity. In the case 
of Timor Leste, these effects may also have considerable consequences for the country’s 
future economic and political stability. Recent episodes of civil violence – including the civil 
strife in 2006 – have been linked to high levels of unemployment and lack of skills among 
young males (Muggah et al. 2010; Scambary 2006). This may well have resulted from lost 
education opportunities among boys during the 25 years of conflict, although we would need 
data beyond 2007 to test this hypothesis in more detail.   
 
4.3 Robustness checks 
We have performed several robustness checks in order to address some important issues 
that may affect our estimates above. The main issues we address are the possible exposure 
of the sample surveyed in 2007 to the civil violence that erupted in Timor Leste in 2006, and 
impending selection biases in the 2001 and 2007 results due to non-random migration 
patterns.  
 
4.3.1 Civil war exposure in 2006 
One important concern with the results discussed in the previous section is whether some 
estimates may be capturing the civil violence that took place in Dili during the implementation 
of the TLSS 2007 (see Section 3). In 2006, Timor Leste experienced large internal civil strife 
as a result of fighting between different factions in the independence forces. The violence in 
2006 resulted in 37 killings, 2,000 severely damaged houses, 3,000 completely destroyed 
houses, and 150,000 displaced people (against 400,000 in 1999) (Muggah et al. 2010; 
Scambary 2006). Most displaced people were located around Dili (65 IDP camps were put in 
place), and were still displaced in 2007. These events took place at the time of the 
implementation of the TLSS 2007 in March 2006. In order to minimize exposure to the 
violence, and due to the security situation, the TLSS 2007 was interrupted and resumed in 
January 2007. All households interviewed previously were re-interviewed. It is, however, still 
possible that some biases may remain. In particular, it is possible that some of the results we 
obtain are not due to exposure to the 1999 violence but to exposure to the civil upheaval in 
2006.  
 
In order to control for this potential exposure to the violence in 2006, we explore a variable in 
the 2007 dataset that captures whether an individual has been absent from home in the past 
12 months for security reasons.27 Our calculations show that individuals who have been 
                                                 
27  Those that declare being absent from home for security reason represents the 2.7 per cent of our sample.  
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absent from home for security reasons in 2006 are all residing in Dili. Therefore, we believe 
that this dummy reliably captures quite well the level of exposure to the 2006 violence.  
 
Table 4.7 (see over) shows these results. The coefficients are almost identical to those in 
Tables 4.3, 4.4 and 4.5 and therefore we do not have any reason to believe that the results 
discussed in Section 4.2 are biased by the effects of the civil violence in 2006.  
 
 
Table 4.7 Robustness check. Effect of conflict on primary school completion in 2007, 
controlling for 2007 civil violence 
 
 Sample1977–1992 Sample1968–1984 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 All Boys Girls All Boys Girls 
Exp in prim school -0.042 -0.186*** 0.105** -0.012 -0.037 0.021 
 (0.029) (0.044) (0.047) (0.024) (0.031) (0.038) 
N Ys Exp in prim school    -0.026** -0.032** -0.021 
    (0.011) (0.014) (0.017) 
Absent home past 12 months 0.083*** 0.066 0.104*** 0.085*** 0.092** 0.080* 
 (0.023) (0.043) (0.032) (0.030) (0.040) (0.045) 
Year fe Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
District fe Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
District trend Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 6676 3383 3293 5195 2625 2570 
Source: Authors’ computations using TLSS 2007. 
Note: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01; Cluster-Robust standard errors in brackets.  
 
 
4.3.2 Migration biases in the analysis of school outcomes in 2001 and 2007 
A final important concern in our analysis is the fact that some individuals have migrated at 
some point in their lives, thereby introducing a potential selection bias in the results. The 
2001 and 2007 datasets provide information on their place of birth and their place of current 
residence.28 If both coincide, then we can infer that they either did not migrate or migrated 
but only temporarily. There is, however, a group of individuals that migrated to a different 
place from the place of birth. The percentage of those that migrated represents 13 per cent 
of the sample in 2001, and 19 per cent and 24 per cent respectively in the two samples of 
2007.29  
 
The data does not allow us to establish when this migration occurred, or whether these 
individuals migrated for conflict related reasons. But a form of selectivity bias may occur if 
individuals did not choose the new place of residence randomly (the so called ‘spatial 
sorting’, see Kondylis 2010). For instance, if we find that those that migrated went to areas in 
which economic conditions are typically better (for instance, urban areas), our results would 
be likely to exhibit a downward bias in the effect of violence on education.  
 
We have estimated the impact of a potential spatial sorting effect in tables 4.8 and 4.9 (for 
2001) and table 4.10 (for 2007). These tables (see over, pages 42–3) show the estimated 
results for the sample of individuals that never moved from the place of birth to the place of 
current residence for 2001 and 2007, respectively. These calculations test if the results in 
Section 4.1 and 4.2 hold if we restrict the sample to those that did not move. The hypothesis 
we test is the following: if the coefficient on violence for those that did not migrate is similar to 
the one that we get when estimating the whole sample, then we can be quite confident in the 
validity of our results and argue that migration does not affect our estimates. 
 
                                                 
28  The 2001 survey also provides information on the place of residence before 1999.  
29  1977–1992 and 1968–1984.  
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Calculations using the 2001 sample show that children that do not move have slightly lower 
attendance rates than the entire sample (71.1 per cent versus 72.1 per cent, respectively). 
This difference is not statistically significant. As a result, the coefficients obtained on the non-
migrant sample (Tables 4.8 and 4.9) do not differ from the results shown in Tables 3.6 and 
3.7. We are able therefore to infer with confidence that our results are not driven by spatial 
sorting biases in the 2001 dataset. 
 
Table 4.10 (page 44) shows the impact of violence on school attainment in 2007 for the 
sample of non-migrant individuals. The coefficients in columns 1-3 do not significantly differ 
from estimates in Table 4.3. Our results of the effects of the 1999 violence on school 
completion in 2007 do not seem therefore to be driven by a process of spatial sorting (i.e. are 
not driven by those that migrated). Columns 4-6 of Table 4.10 show slightly weaker results 
than those in table 4.4 and 4.5, but the main coefficients do not change substantially. 
 
Table 4.8 Robustness check. Impact of 1999 violence on school attendance in 2001, 
controlling for migration 
 
Panel A – Displaced 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
 All Boys Girls All Boys Girls All Boys Girls 
 8-11 8-11 8-11 8-9 8-9 8-9 10-11 10-11 10-11 
y2 0.065*** 0.065*** 0.065*** 0.140*** 0.133*** 0.148*** -0.005 -0.000 -0.012 
 (0.018) (0.025) (0.024) (0.026) (0.034) (0.036) (0.020) (0.028) (0.027) 
y3 0.247*** 0.245*** 0.249*** 0.348*** 0.316*** 0.387*** 0.152*** 0.176*** 0.124*** 
 (0.021) (0.024) (0.029) (0.028) (0.036) (0.044) (0.021) (0.029) (0.032) 
c1y2 -0.200*** -0.213*** -0.188** -0.199*** -0.218*** -0.180** -0.215*** -0.231** -0.200** 
 (0.052) (0.063) (0.072) (0.054) (0.072) (0.090) (0.072) (0.099) (0.093) 
c1y3 -0.144*** -0.130*** -0.157*** -0.198*** -0.173** -0.231*** -0.102** -0.100 -0.093 
 (0.038) (0.050) (0.053) (0.054) (0.080) (0.078) (0.042) (0.061) (0.060) 
N 2553 1383 1170 1254 693 561 1299 690 609 
r2 0.157 0.161 0.154 0.217 0.198 0.243 0.124 0.144 0.104 
Source: Authors’ computations using TLSS 2001. 
Note: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01; Cluster-Robust standard errors in brackets. 
 
Panel B – House completely damaged 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
 All Boys Girls All Boys Girls All Boys Girls 
 8-11 8-11 8-11 8-9 8-9 8-9 10-11 10-11 10-11 
y2 0.065*** 0.066*** 0.064*** 0.129*** 0.129*** 0.129*** 0.003 -0.000 0.006 
 (0.018) (0.024) (0.023) (0.025) (0.034) (0.034) (0.020) (0.028) (0.028) 
y3 0.224*** 0.227*** 0.221*** 0.303*** 0.281*** 0.331*** 0.149*** 0.171*** 0.126*** 
 (0.020) (0.024) (0.029) (0.028) (0.036) (0.044) (0.021) (0.030) (0.031) 
c2y2 -0.124*** -0.119* -0.129** -0.090 -0.129 -0.046 -0.157*** -0.100 -0.234*** 
 (0.047) (0.061) (0.062) (0.057) (0.079) (0.081) (0.055) (0.074) (0.070) 
c2y3 0.005 0.003 0.007 0.054 0.040 0.065 -0.043 -0.021 -0.080* 
 (0.044) (0.054) (0.056) (0.065) (0.084) (0.086) (0.038) (0.055) (0.048) 
N 2553 1383 1170 1254 693 561 1299 690 609 
r2 0.154 0.157 0.150 0.211 0.195 0.232 0.122 0.134 0.119 
Source: Authors’ computations using TLSS 2001. 
Note: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01; Cluster-Robust standard errors in brackets. 
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Panel C – Combining the two channel of violence exposure 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
 All Boys Girls All Boys Girls All Boys Girls 
 8-11 8-11 8-11 8-9 8-9 8-9 10-11 10-11 10-11 
y2 0.070*** 0.071*** 0.069*** 0.135*** 0.136*** 0.133*** 0.010 0.006 0.014 
 (0.019) (0.025) (0.025) (0.027) (0.037) (0.035) (0.021) (0.028) (0.029) 
y3 0.232*** 0.237*** 0.226*** 0.319*** 0.302*** 0.342*** 0.151*** 0.172*** 0.128*** 
 (0.022) (0.026) (0.032) (0.030) (0.039) (0.048) (0.023) (0.031) (0.034) 
c1y2 -0.053 -0.071 -0.042 -0.049 -0.073 -0.028 -0.090 -0.149 -0.070 
 (0.058) (0.067) (0.076) (0.067) (0.072) (0.110) (0.085) (0.136) (0.104) 
c1y3 -0.082 -0.150** -0.037 -0.148** -0.240*** -0.079 -0.031 -0.029 -0.017 
 (0.053) (0.066) (0.074) (0.070) (0.074) (0.114) (0.065) (0.137) (0.075) 
c2y2 -0.027 -0.031 -0.022 0.025 -0.018 0.067 -0.081 -0.031 -0.152** 
 (0.057) (0.077) (0.067) (0.072) (0.100) (0.089) (0.061) (0.086) (0.069) 
c2y3 0.077 0.043 0.118* 0.145* 0.080 0.201** 0.006 0.023 -0.024 
 (0.055) (0.070) (0.065) (0.079) (0.104) (0.096) (0.047) (0.069) (0.057) 
c1c2y2 -0.263** -0.206 -0.326** -0.329*** -0.255* -0.403** -0.162 -0.090 -0.192 
 (0.108) (0.129) (0.143) (0.120) (0.153) (0.177) (0.141) (0.199) (0.179) 
c1c2y3 -0.167* 0.002 -0.343*** -0.191 0.068 -0.464*** -0.126 -0.114 -0.154 
 (0.088) (0.113) (0.096) (0.126) (0.169) (0.136) (0.088) (0.159) (0.107) 
N 2553 1383 1170 1254 693 561 1299 690 609 
r2 0.169 0.169 0.173 0.232 0.215 0.263 0.135 0.146 0.132 
Source: Authors’ computations using TLSS 2001. 
Note: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01; Cluster-Robust standard errors in brackets. 
 
 
Table 4.9 Robustness check. Impact of 1999 violence on grade deficit in 2001, 
controlling for migration 
 
Panel A – Displaced 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
 All Boys Girls All Boys Girls All Boys Girls 
 8-11 8-11 8-11 8-9 8-9 8-9 10-11 10-11 10-11 
y2 0.234*** 0.215*** 0.256*** 0.264*** 0.253*** 0.277*** 0.215*** 0.191*** 0.243*** 
 (0.031) (0.041) (0.040) (0.043) (0.058) (0.067) (0.037) (0.051) (0.047) 
y3 0.414*** 0.393*** 0.439*** 0.473*** 0.446*** 0.508*** 0.378*** 0.359*** 0.400*** 
 (0.043) (0.052) (0.054) (0.060) (0.076) (0.087) (0.048) (0.063) (0.059) 
c1y2 -0.007 0.058 -0.065 -0.110 -0.053 -0.172* 0.090 0.194 0.017 
 (0.071) (0.097) (0.084) (0.070) (0.107) (0.093) (0.101) (0.163) (0.113) 
c1y3 -0.014 -0.029 -0.010 -0.114 -0.196 -0.034 0.066 0.180 -0.009 
 (0.094) (0.109) (0.139) (0.131) (0.152) (0.221) (0.109) (0.142) (0.149) 
N 1407 741 666 561 309 252 846 432 414 
r2 0.219 0.208 0.234 0.244 0.237 0.264 0.207 0.198 0.220 
Source: Authors’ computations using TLSS 2001. 
Note: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01; Cluster-Robust standard errors in brackets. 
 
Panel B – House completely damaged 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
 All Boys Girls All Boys Girls All Boys Girls 
 8-11 8-11 8-11 8-9 8-9 8-9 10-11 10-11 10-11 
y2 0.236*** 0.234*** 0.239*** 0.228*** 0.232*** 0.224*** 0.242*** 0.236*** 0.248*** 
 (0.033) (0.044) (0.039) (0.041) (0.057) (0.062) (0.039) (0.054) (0.048) 
y3 0.394*** 0.365*** 0.426*** 0.416*** 0.366*** 0.478*** 0.379*** 0.364*** 0.394*** 
 (0.043) (0.053) (0.056) (0.058) (0.073) (0.089) (0.051) (0.070) (0.062) 
c2y2 -0.019 -0.053 0.022 0.061 0.054 0.070 -0.067 -0.119 -0.006 
 (0.061) (0.084) (0.089) (0.079) (0.121) (0.128) (0.084) (0.112) (0.106) 
c2y3 0.081 0.108 0.052 0.163 0.206 0.111 0.034 0.048 0.019 
 (0.078) (0.101) (0.120) (0.134) (0.188) (0.223) (0.096) (0.121) (0.128) 
N 1407 741 666 561 309 252 846 432 414 
r2 0.222 0.214 0.234 0.245 0.238 0.260 0.208 0.200 0.221 
Source: Authors’ computations using TLSS 2001. 
Note: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01; Cluster-Robust standard errors in brackets. 
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Panel C – Combining the two channel of violence exposure 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
 All Boys Girls All Boys Girls All Boys Girls 
 8-11 8-11 8-11 8-9 8-9 8-9 10-11 10-11 10-11 
y2 0.250*** 0.237*** 0.265*** 0.244*** 0.224*** 0.268*** 0.254*** 0.245*** 0.263*** 
 (0.035) (0.046) (0.044) (0.047) (0.065) (0.072) (0.041) (0.056) (0.053) 
y3 0.401*** 0.376*** 0.430*** 0.415*** 0.373*** 0.464*** 0.393*** 0.377*** 0.411*** 
 (0.046) (0.057) (0.059) (0.062) (0.080) (0.091) (0.054) (0.072) (0.068) 
c1y2 -0.114 -0.026 -0.185** -0.090 0.043 -0.268*** -0.143* -0.245*** -0.120 
 (0.074) (0.105) (0.071) (0.088) (0.133) (0.072) (0.081) (0.056) (0.111) 
c1y3 -0.060 -0.113 -0.030 0.008 -0.040 0.081 -0.171 -0.377*** -0.125 
 (0.130) (0.161) (0.168) (0.175) (0.200) (0.297) (0.132) (0.072) (0.170) 
c2y2 -0.093 -0.115 -0.058 0.116 0.151 0.065 -0.209*** -0.285*** -0.113 
 (0.057) (0.092) (0.084) (0.097) (0.144) (0.173) (0.074) (0.103) (0.093) 
c2y3 0.070 0.088 0.052 0.345** 0.377* 0.313 -0.082 -0.097 -0.061 
 (0.090) (0.124) (0.123) (0.159) (0.218) (0.279) (0.109) (0.147) (0.126) 
c1c2y2 0.311** 0.262 0.331* -0.116 -0.418** 0.185 0.598*** 0.841*** 0.415* 
 (0.156) (0.209) (0.186) (0.169) (0.178) (0.248) (0.177) (0.204) (0.221) 
c1c2y3 0.073 0.149 0.018 -0.538* -0.710** -0.484 0.526** 0.875*** 0.330 
 (0.224) (0.244) (0.312) (0.300) (0.291) (0.477) (0.216) (0.219) (0.306) 
N 1407 741 666 561 309 252 846 432 414 
r2 0.226 0.219 0.240 0.263 0.267 0.285 0.225 0.231 0.229 
Source: Authors’ computations using TLSS 2001. 
Note: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01; Cluster-Robust standard errors in brackets. 
 
 
Table 4.10 Robustness check. Effect of conflict on primary school completion in 2007 , 
controlling for migration 
 
 Sample1977-1992 Sample1968-1984 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 All Boys Girls All Boys Girls 
Exp in prim school -0.033 -0.166*** 0.103* 0.023 -0.009 0.064 
 (0.036) (0.054) (0.057) (0.029) (0.036) (0.048) 
N Ys Exp in prim school    -0.015 -0.018 -0.014 
    (0.013) (0.016) (0.021) 
Year fe Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
District fe Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
District trend Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 5446 2803 2643 3963 2041 1922 
Source: Authors’ computations using TLSS 2007. 
Note: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01; Cluster-Robust standard errors in brackets. 
 
 
5 Conclusions 
 
The aim of this paper was to examine the effects of the conflict in Timor Leste on educational 
outcomes among boys and girls exposed to the violence that took place in 1999 following the 
withdrawal of Indonesian troops from the territory. We analysed the short-term impact on 
primary school attendance and grade deficits in 2001, and the longer-term impact on school 
completion for cohorts of children of primary school age in 1999 observed in 2007. We also 
analysed the impact of peaks of violence in the 1970s and 1980s on schooling outcomes in 
2007 (among those that were of primary school age at the time of the various violent events), 
as well as the overall impact of the conflict. This has enabled us for the first time to compare 
the impact of violent conflict on educational outcomes in the short, medium and long terms. 
 
The conflict in Timor Leste has led to considerable adverse impacts on educational 
outcomes among children exposed to the violence, boys in particular. We find that the impact 
of the conflict on girls’ education is statistically insignificant in most cases, and positive in 
some cases. Because girls’ educational outcomes were catching-up to boys’ education 
before 1999, we interpret this result as suggesting that the catching up process continued 
once the 1999 conflict was over. The 25 years of violent conflict had, in contrast, a clear 
negative impact on the education of boys in Timor Leste. This result is consistent for different 
peaks of violence throughout the conflict in Timor Leste: the education of boys was more 
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negatively affected by peaks of violence in the earlier stages of the conflict, by the violent 
events in 1999 and on average throughout the overall conflict. Generations of young 
Timorese boys have therefore experienced considerable reductions in their accumulation of 
human capital, which may well now be reflected in increases in insecurity, unemployment 
and violence in the territory since 2006.  
 
We believe this impact of violence on boys’ education reflects a potential household 
investment trade-off between education and economic survival, where boys would have been 
removed from school (or reduced school attendance) in order to participate in household 
economic activities. It is also possible that boys (older boys in particular) may have joined the 
armed rebellion, but we cannot test this hypothesis with the data we have available. 
 
These results have important policy implications. The first is that the reconstruction of the 
education sector in the immediate aftermath of conflict can produce considerable results in 
mitigating the destruction caused by the violence. The evidence we have examined seems to 
suggest that conflict did not impose any significant damage to the catching-up process in 
girls’ education or to education outcomes among some boys. Given the almost total 
destruction of schools and the lack of teachers and infrastructure, this result may well attest 
for the success of the reconstruction efforts of the international community and the people of 
Timor Leste.  
 
The second implication is that reconstruction policies must pay greater attention to their 
redistributive impacts across gender and across different population characteristics. Although 
girls recovered quickly from the conflict, boys did not. The mechanisms that explain the 
adverse consequences of violent conflict on educational outcomes are very complex and 
differ substantially between boys and girls and across age groups. Policy interventions in 
post-conflict countries have stressed the disproportional victimization of girls (DFID 2009; 
UNESCO 2011). However, boys can get caught by adverse impacts of violence in ways that 
still remain under-researched. The evidence for Timor Leste suggests that boys were very 
vulnerable to the educational effects of violence. This result implies that much more attention 
must be paid to understanding how children are affected by violent conflict and the different 
roles girls and boys assume during and after the conflict. 
 
The third implication is that conflict is not a uniform phenomenon. Violent conflict affects 
different people and different aspects of their welfare through different channels. In the case 
of Timor Leste, and in line to evidence from other conflicts such as Colombia (see Ibáñez 
and Moya 2009, for instance), displacement has particularly adverse effects on educational 
outcomes. The recently released Education for All Global Monitoring report by UNESCO 
(2011) portrays displaced populations as the hidden victims of conflict. A significantly 
disproportional number of displaced children are out of school (even in comparison to 
conflict-affected populations in the same country), while enrolment rates among displaced 
populations across the world average around 69 per cent for primary school and 30 per cent 
for secondary school. The analysis of Timor Leste confirms the extreme disadvantage that 
displaced populations face in terms of lost educational opportunities. This is likely to affect 
generations of boys in Timor Leste, possibly perpetuating the risks associated with renewed 
conflict in the future.    
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